At present, it is very difficult for China to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. If China interferes in the internal affairs of any country, other countries can legitimately interfere in Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.

There’s a lot more at stake than just Chinese-US relations in the event that China began exporting weapons and other material support to communist movements around Asia.

With the exception of Vietnam and Laos, China’s neighbours are all capitalist states. Of particular diplomatic interest are:-

1. South Korea, a capitalist state which enjoys an important and extensive trade relationship (China absorbs >25% of SK exports, making them their biggest trading partner), but is still nonetheless hosting an occupying US military force, including the installation of THAAD anti-missile weapons intended to neutralise the Chinese intermediate missile deterrent. The historical antagonism between south Korea and China has been steadily tempered through the incentives that stem from their burgeoning trade relationship, but it doesn’t change the fact that relations are still complicated by the presence of US armed forces and the frozen conflict with North Korea. Were the Chinese to start arming the Filipinos, the North Koreans would surely expect more arms and aid as well, which risks ostracising the South and driving them further into the arms of the United States. Support for communist causes in South Korea would likewise give South Korea reason to push back against further constructive relationships with China.

2. Japan, the US’ primary lilypad in the far East, now shares very deep trade relations with China, just as it does with Korea. Despite large scale trade sweetening their relationship somewhat, Chinese-Japanese relations are strained by disputes over islands in the south China sea. Open Chinese support for communist dominance in east Asia will boost the already paranoid atmosphere between both countries to new heights, justifying the continued American military presence at bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan, as well as helping Japanese ultranationalists in building the case for the repeal of Article 9 and the reconstruction of aggressive Japanese armed forces in the pacific.

3. Singapore, home to the US’ main naval base in the pacific, likewise has a similar balancing act in place. Antagonising Singapore in this way could run the risk of seeing them restrict the flow of Chinese trade across the strait of Malacca, the seaborne trade route that presently carries ~33% of Chinese exports to markets out west. It goes without saying that a renewed open class struggle in Asia would spook the government of this most fundamentally capitalist of Asian states. If I was in their shoes, I’d also start reconsidering the long term outlook of whether or not to align with a state that is exporting a movement that would topple their establishment.

So with all this considered, the relationship between China and the capitalist Philippines has ramifications beyond just its own immediate relations. It has a cascading effect to the rest of China’s immediate neighbours, neighbours it has been carefully cultivating economic and diplomatic relationships with since they opened up their country after Mao died. These neighbours are China’s most important geo-political relationships, as once estranged they can easily become a new front of imperialist pressure from the West. Notice that this doesn’t preclude China from offering aid and other mutually beneficial relationships with other socialist and anti-imperialist states such as Cuba, Nicaragua or Venezuela, countries far from China where there are no immediate security risks from surrounding countries. There would be potential for China to prop up a communist Philippines should the CPA ever succeed in conquering state power, but even that is dependent on the overall community of nations, particularly the ASEAN countries, accepting the new situation.