With almost 6 months of this war approaching, I think it’s time to kinda recap, reevaluate and redicuss this war. Curious what yous think about the state of the armies, the strategies of either side, what are your predictions, what do you think the goals are and who’s closer to achieving them?

I’ll go first and mostly talk about the Russian side to keep it shorter and because it’s the active party mostly.

Strategy

Honestly even after 6 months I find this incredibly hard to pin down. What are their plans with this war geopolitically and on the ground? Yes, we’ve heard “demilitarization” and “denazification” when things first started, talk about creating a multipolar world has since started too. But let’s be real, that’s all incredibly vague and the Russians really aren’t communicating anything more specific at all. The liberation of Donbass is the one concrete goal I can make out.

Do they want a landlocked Ukraine, destroy it completely, demilitarize and destabilize the entire West, just liberate Donbass? I don’t know and to me it feels like they didn’t start this war with a clear, concrete goal. Maybe they had one but didn’t anticipate the dimensions this would take, maybe it’s all going according to plan - I’m just unable to tell and to me it feels like nobody on either side is able to tell either.

What’s the strategy on the ground? Again, Russia is obv tight lipped about this, but I still can’t tell this one either. What feels somewhat certain is the following

  • The pace is absurdly slow
  • This whole thing has mostly become a positional artillery war of attrition
  • Russia is unwilling or incapable of sacrificing large amounts of men, civilians and equipment in big armored assaults
  • Size of the invasion force has been constant despite Russia being outnumbered

So where does that leave us? My most generous interpretation is that Russia is content with shelling the Ukrainians to hell, while fixing its own economy, doing its best to erode US and EU positions around the world and deepening their internal crises. That they’re unimpressed with the fallout of sanctions, they don’t care about completing things fast at all and really the kinetic war has been relegated to second priority, behind the larger economic and geopolitical calculations. That it’s useful, because the West needs to dig itself deeper into the mess the longer this goes on and because it allows Russia to demilitarize NATO at a comfy pace without engaging it directly.

The least favourable interpretation is that Russia is not capable of going any faster than it is currently, either because it isn’t viable politically (eg declaration of war, higher casualties) or it militarily just can’t. That they didn’t have a clear plan going into this, got caught off-guard by the Wests rabid response and now don’t have the means or the plans to end both the kinetic war and the fires it started.

No idea which is closer to the truth and I’m not going to be a smartass and just say it’s something in the middle. It doesn’t feel super well thought out and planned, it doesn’t feel like a panicked, incompetent adventure at all either and it also doesn’t feel like some mix of the two.

Predictions

Always hard to make in war and politics, but especially so in this war. Just a couple I feel somewhat confident in

  • This war isn’t ending this year
  • Ukraine doesn’t have and won’t have any offensive potential
  • Russian offensives on Kharkiv, Odessa, Nikolaev, etc are hopium. They won’t assault them, they won’t encircle them and they won’t besiege them this year. If they could or wanted to they would’ve done so early in the war
  • Bakhmut-Siversk line will take at least another month to take/break
  • Unless UAF collapses somehow, Slavyansk & Kramatorsk won’t fall this year

Fall and winter are approaching and I’d imagine that’ll slow the absurdly slow pace even further at some point. But I reckon winter will decide this war anyway with the economic and social crisis really kicking the EU in the gut by then. They won’t be able to support Ukraine past a point and Ukraine is simply not capable of surviving without foreign help anymore.

Other than that I only see a few options how this whole thing could change its dynamic. A declaration of war and mobilization, a collapse of the West, a collapse of the UAF or deployment of Russian reserves in Ukraine after the referendums to free up more regulars for combat. Last one seems most likely, but no idea if that’ll really change things that much.

Bottom line

Rereading this feels like a whole lot of “idk”, but honestly, despite heavily engaging with this conflict almost everyday for the past 6 months, that’s still pretty much where I’m at. It’s uniquely strange to me and just very hard to really make sense of - propaganda and fog of war certainly aren’t helping.

Keen on reading your opinions and whether you guys have been able to make more sense of it than my dumbass.

Cheers

  • @OrnluWolfjarl
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    62 years ago

    It’s quite obvious that Russia aims to:

    • take over at least eastern Ukraine, where the people are mostly pro-Russian, and most resources are concentrated.

    • destroy the military capabilities of Ukraine. A war of attrition makes sense with this goal in mind, particarly frequent strikes at headquarters and military industrial facilities.

    • dismantle/weaken the neonazi military groups that are participating in the fighting. Strikes and assaults against their positions seem to be a priority.

    • destabilize Ukraine economically and politically. Prolonging the war as much as possible achieves this. After 6 months and Ukraine is already facing hyperinflation and huge debts. The people are losing faith in the government. The West is quickly losing interest in supporting Ukraine. Destabilization would mean that if Ukraine keeps existing, it’ll be easier to control politically by Russia.

    • wait for winter to make living in Ukraine that much more difficult. Winter would also greatly weaken the position of Ukrainian armed force, which is already suffering from supply issues. I think Russia hopes that desertions and draft evasion will ramp up.

    • damage the economies of the EU countries and create issues for NATO. The EU is hoping for a quick end to the war, preferably before winter, so they can start lifting sanctions and resume the gas flow. If this doesn’t happen then the EU is more likely to lift the sanctions anyway and pressure Ukraine to enter negotiations. Long-term, damage to the EU would mean less meddling in the Russian geopolitical space and possibly reluctance to keep following US foreign policy so closely.

    • increase Russia’s global influence. The more damage to EU and the US, the more able is Russia to swoop in and take advantage of the vacuum around the world. We are already seeing this in North Africa, where Russia has taken advantage of the retreat of Western neocolonial forces (e.g. In Mali). Russian actions have also attracted support from most of Asia. BRICS has been strengthened more in the last 6 months than since its founding. Being willing to resist the US giant and showing that it can maintain the fight long-term has attracted many oppressed countries to the Russian banner.

    • either force Ukraine to the negotiating table, where Russia will demand guarantees against joining NATO and recognizing the annexation of the occupied territories, or take over the whole of Ukraine. Either goal becomes more and more achievable the longer the fighting is kept up.

    Also, keep in mind that Russia wishes to keep its own attrition to a minimum and it’s currently facing the most defensible line of Ukraine, with a minimal but superior Russian force. Russia is basically performing a siege, waiting for the Ukrainian forces to weaken enough so it can initiate an assault.