I’d argue that western reaction to the war made it clear to most Russians that this is an existential war for them. Russians realize that this isn’t a war between Russia and Ukraine, but one between Russia and a proxy of NATO. We’re seeing that Russian army has no trouble doing recruitment right now without even a need for mobilization. So, the population difference is already playing a role here.
I disagree regarding Ukraine not needing industry. The reality is that the amount of material support the west is able to provide is quite limited. Simply throwing money at Ukraine isn’t actually solving any problems that Ukraine has. For example, EU pledged to deliver a million shells to Ukraine. However, EU lacks the industrial capacity to do this and now they’ve admitted that they can only deliver around a third of that. Meanwhile, all they managed to do was to raise the price of shells:
US isn’t doing much better in this regard either. US steel production is comparable to Russia’s, and despite all the talk the actual increase in shell production has been meagre so far.
The other huge risk for Ukraine being entirely reliant on western support is that it’s not going to be indefinite. Western economies are going into a recession, and public support for continuing to dump money into Ukraine is fizzling now. Given that Ukraine has reorganized its economy around western support, this rug getting pulled out from under them will be catastrophic.
I do agree with your assessment of Russian approach. They’re being very conservative, and are basically relying on attrition to deplete Ukrainian army. Mearsheimer makes an important point that most casualties are caused by artillery, and Russia has something like 10:1 advantage in artillery in Ukraine. So, as you note, the strategy has largely been to force Ukraine into artillery battles where Russia has a huge advantage.
I’d argue that western reaction to the war made it clear to most Russians that this is an existential war for them. Russians realize that this isn’t a war between Russia and Ukraine, but one between Russia and a proxy of NATO. We’re seeing that Russian army has no trouble doing recruitment right now without even a need for mobilization. So, the population difference is already playing a role here.
I disagree regarding Ukraine not needing industry. The reality is that the amount of material support the west is able to provide is quite limited. Simply throwing money at Ukraine isn’t actually solving any problems that Ukraine has. For example, EU pledged to deliver a million shells to Ukraine. However, EU lacks the industrial capacity to do this and now they’ve admitted that they can only deliver around a third of that. Meanwhile, all they managed to do was to raise the price of shells:
US isn’t doing much better in this regard either. US steel production is comparable to Russia’s, and despite all the talk the actual increase in shell production has been meagre so far.
The other huge risk for Ukraine being entirely reliant on western support is that it’s not going to be indefinite. Western economies are going into a recession, and public support for continuing to dump money into Ukraine is fizzling now. Given that Ukraine has reorganized its economy around western support, this rug getting pulled out from under them will be catastrophic.
I do agree with your assessment of Russian approach. They’re being very conservative, and are basically relying on attrition to deplete Ukrainian army. Mearsheimer makes an important point that most casualties are caused by artillery, and Russia has something like 10:1 advantage in artillery in Ukraine. So, as you note, the strategy has largely been to force Ukraine into artillery battles where Russia has a huge advantage.