Quoting R. Keith Schoppa in Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945, pages 168–9:

With the Guomindang government now out of the picture, native banks were given the opportunity to revive their flagging fortunes under [Axis] patronage. In the initial days of the occupation the [Imperialists] clearly saw the modern banks as conquered institutions, standing as symbols of the defeated régime and as sources of much needed cash.

(Note: ‘native banks’ are distinguished from ‘modern banks’, the latter ‘which lent money to the government and became depositories of government funds.’)

The [Imperialists] turned the modern banks into their main political and police headquarters: The China Bank became the headquarters not only of the collaborationist Support Society but also of the [Imperial] Special Services Unit, while the Farmers’ Bank became the headquarters of the [Imperial] Military Police. But the physical occupation of the government’s central financial institutions was more than symbolic. The [Imperialists] were ruthlessly determined to seize all the modern banks’ cash reserves and precious metals, an opportunity afforded largely by the malfeasance of the county government. For over a month after the April takeover, the [Imperialists] undertook a reign of terror against modern bank managers and all their employees […] in order to gain further information about possible hidden cash reserves. […] There is no data, however, to suggest that the [Axis] took any funds from the native banks throughout the occupation, leaving one to wonder whether Feng’s agreement to collaborate may have been a quid pro quo arrangement.

The Imperialists’ deprecation of modern banks might come across as ‘anticapitalist’ to some, but whether it was intentional or not, it actually produced benefits for other capitalists:

After an initial period of wariness following the city’s seizure, some native banks reopened. With Feng’s strong patronage they began to flourish, even though the collaborationist authorities in Hangzhou had established a number of modern bank branches in Shaoxing. The economic recovery engineered by Feng and the lack of modern bank competition helped make native banks more prosperous than before the war. As the occupation continued, the native banks reportedly became involved in black market activity, hoarding, speculation, and the manipulation of rates of exchange, activities which brought even greater profits.

A note concerning these banks during the rest of the 1940s…

Pages 176–7:

Native banks throughout Zhejiang remained stronger than modern-style banks, and retained their local reputation, which made them in the postwar years the major source of monies for business and industry. In 1946, 70 percent of the reserves in provincial financial institutions were in modern banks with only 30 percent in native banks; but in Shaoxing slightly over half of the reserve funds were in native banks. More tellingly, of all the loans from financial institutions in the province, 65 percent came from modern banks in Shaoxing while 70 percent came from native banks. In short, the native banks experienced no apparent repercussions from their collaboration.

[…]

[F]or the large number of native bank figures who became involved in Feng’s government, the desire to reassert themselves as chief financial institutions while the modern-style banks had been temporarily shut down must have been a powerful motive attracting bankers to the régime.

(Emphasis added in all cases.)