Considering we are nearing the even year of 2024, with a lot of elections worldwide (And in the USA too I guess), I’d like to leave here an article of Lenin pondering the usefulness of participating in bourgeois (or in his case, tsarist) elections.

As some context, this article was published after the 1905 Revolution, specifically after the initial purely advisory (“Bulygin”) Duma election that never happened due to the Revolution, the actual First, more parliamentary (“Witte’s”) Duma was boycotted by the RSDLP and dissolved by the Tsar, and the election of a Second Duma (Stolypin’s) was announced without date.

Summing it up, he describes the decision of the RSDLP for boycotting the previous election as correct, as it would sap energy of the revolutionary forces for no gain and provide legitimacy for a purely decorative body, during a time of massive agitation. However he also points to interesting questions of whether or not it would be worth it to participate in the following elections, but refuting idealistic notions that elections are either useful or useless in themselves without the material context in which they’re held.

He also points to the usefulness of elections for the tsarist/bourgeois regime, that can be used as a release valve for revolutionary energy in disguise of a “concession”, without actually changing the material conditions.

Some key sections for me:

The principal difference between revolutionary Social-Democracy and opportunist Social-Democracy on the question of boycott is as follows: the opportunists in all circumstances confine themselves to applying the stereotyped method copied from a specific period in the history of German socialism. We must utilise representative institutions; the Duma is a representative institution; therefore boycott is anarchism, and we must go into the Duma. All the arguments used by our Mensheviks, and especially by Plekhanov, on this topic, could be reduced to this childishly simple syllogism. The Menshevik resolution on the importance of representative institutions in a revolutionary period (see Parttiniye Izvestia) strikingly reveals the stereotyped and anti-historical nature of their argument.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, lay chief emphasis on the necessity of carefully appraising the concrete political situation. It is impossible to cope with the tasks of the revolutionary epoch in Russia by copying in a biased manner one of the recent German stereotyped patterns, forgetting the lessons of 1847-48. The progress of our revolution will be altogether incomprehensible if we confine ourselves to making bare contrasts between “anarchist” boycott and Social-Democratic participation in elections. Learn from the history of the Russian revolution, gentlemen!

[…] This brings us to the crux of the question of present-day Social-Democratic tactics. The issue now is not whether we should take part in the elections. To say “yes” or no in this case means saying nothing at all about the fundamental problem of the moment. Outwardly, the political situation in August 1906 is similar to that in August 1905, but enormous progress has been made during this period: the forces that are fighting on the respective sides, the forms of the struggle, and the time required for carrying out this or that strategic move—if we may so express it— have all become more exactly defined.

[…] Hence the conclusion: it would be ridiculous to shut our eyes to realities. The time has now come when the revolutionary Social-Democrats must cease to be boycottists. We shall not refuse to go into the Second Duma when (or “if”) it is convened. We shall not refuse to utilise this arena, but we shall not exaggerate its modest importance; on the contrary, guided by the experience already provided by history, we shall entirely subordinate the struggle we wage in the Duma to another form of struggle, namely, strikes, up risings, etc. We shall convene the Fifth Party Congress; there we shall resolve that in the event of elections taking place, it will be necessary to enter into an electoral agreement, for a few weeks, with the Trudoviks (unless the Fifth Party Congress is convened it will be impossible to conduct a united election campaign; and “blocs with other parties” are absolutely prohibited by the decision of the Fourth Congress). And then we shall utterly rout the Cadets.

This conclusion, however, does not by any means reveal the whole complexity of the task that confronts us. We deliberately emphasised the words: “in the event of elections taking place”, etc. We do not know yet whether the Second Duma will be convened, when the elections will take place, what the electoral laws will be like, or what the situation will be at that time. Hence our conclusion suffers from being extremely general: we need it to enable us to sum up past experience, to take note of the lessons of the past, to put the forthcoming questions of tactics on a proper basis; but it is totally inadequate for solving the concrete problems of immediate tactics.

Only Cadets and the “Cadet-like” people of all sorts can be satisfied with such a conclusion at the present time, can create a “slogan” for themselves out of the yearnings for a new Duma and try to persuade the government of the desirability of convening it as quickly as possible, etc. Only conscious or unconscious traitors to the revolution would at the present time exert all efforts to divert the inevitable new rise of temper and excitement into the channel of an election and not into that of a fight waged by means of a general strike and uprising.

[…] The government’s plan is clear. It was absolutely right in its calculations when it fixed the date of the convocation of the Duma and did not fix—contrary to the law—the date of the elections. The government does not want to tie its hands or show its cards. Firstly, it is gaining time in which to consider an amendment of the electoral law. Secondly— and this is the most important—it is keeping the date of the elections in reserve until the character and intensity of the new rise of temper can be fully gauged. The government wishes to fix the date of the elections at the particular time (and perhaps in the particular form, i.e., the form of elections) when it can split and paralyse the incipient uprising. The government’s reasoning is correct: if things remain quiet, perhaps we shall not convene the Duma at all, or revert to the Bulygin laws. If, however, a strong movement arises, then we can try to split it by fixing a date for the elections for the time being and in this way entice certain cowards and simpletons away from the direct revolutionary struggle.

To sum up. We must take into account the experience of the Cadet Duma and spread its lessons among the masses. We must prove to them that the Duma is “useless”, that a constituent assembly is essential, that the Cadets are wavering; we must demand that the Trudoviks throw off the yoke of the Cadets, and we must support the former against the latter. We must recognise at once the need for an electoral agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks in the event of new elections taking place. We must exert all our efforts to counteract the government’s plan to split the uprising by ordering elections. Advocating their tried revolutionary slogans with greater energy than ever, Social-Democrats must exert every effort to unite all the revolutionary elements and classes more closely, to convert the upsurge that is probable in the near future into an armed uprising of the whole people against the tsarist government.