In the case of the conflict in Ukraine, the Donbass militias from 2014 up until 2022 had, for the most part (with the exception of an air force), the same weapons as the Kiev regime because there were large numbers of defections from the Ukrainian army to the rebel side at the start of the war. Additionally they also captured more weapons after their initial victories. I believe this reflects what would happen in any other revolutionary scenario as well:
A portion of the armed forces would defect to the revolution bringing with them weapons, and more would be acquired as the conflict evolves. Yes the state may retain a monopoly on conventional air power (i specify conventional because drones will become increasingly ubiquitous on the battlefield and they would not be hard for revolutionary forces to acquire) but at the end of the day planes can’t take and hold ground, and you can’t win a war against insurgents through bombing alone, as we have learned over the decades of so-called “war on terror”.
Satellite surveillance is a complication but not an insurmountable one, and an army can learn to work around it as both sides in the Ukraine conflict have done, through dispersal of forces, hidden bases, etc. The tactics employed by the resistance forces in Gaza can also be studied and learned from as they are fighting in an environment of exceptionally dense surveillance yet are managing to prove very elusive for the occupier.
The biggest challenges in a revolutionary situation in my opinion are the political and the logistical. First and foremost revolutionaries must secure a base of support among the people, then maintain and expand that base by demonstrating through their actions that they are fighting for the people. They must also wage ideological struggle against opportunist elements in their own ranks.
Secondly it is essential for revolutionaries to be organized so that they can establish systems of supply and support for their fighters, as well as some form of effective command and control, even if this comes in a more decentralized form than conventional armies are used to, provided they retain the ability to co-ordinate on a large scale and maintain overall strategic unity.
In the case of the conflict in Ukraine, the Donbass militias from 2014 up until 2022 had, for the most part (with the exception of an air force), the same weapons as the Kiev regime because there were large numbers of defections from the Ukrainian army to the rebel side at the start of the war. Additionally they also captured more weapons after their initial victories. I believe this reflects what would happen in any other revolutionary scenario as well:
A portion of the armed forces would defect to the revolution bringing with them weapons, and more would be acquired as the conflict evolves. Yes the state may retain a monopoly on conventional air power (i specify conventional because drones will become increasingly ubiquitous on the battlefield and they would not be hard for revolutionary forces to acquire) but at the end of the day planes can’t take and hold ground, and you can’t win a war against insurgents through bombing alone, as we have learned over the decades of so-called “war on terror”.
Satellite surveillance is a complication but not an insurmountable one, and an army can learn to work around it as both sides in the Ukraine conflict have done, through dispersal of forces, hidden bases, etc. The tactics employed by the resistance forces in Gaza can also be studied and learned from as they are fighting in an environment of exceptionally dense surveillance yet are managing to prove very elusive for the occupier.
The biggest challenges in a revolutionary situation in my opinion are the political and the logistical. First and foremost revolutionaries must secure a base of support among the people, then maintain and expand that base by demonstrating through their actions that they are fighting for the people. They must also wage ideological struggle against opportunist elements in their own ranks.
Secondly it is essential for revolutionaries to be organized so that they can establish systems of supply and support for their fighters, as well as some form of effective command and control, even if this comes in a more decentralized form than conventional armies are used to, provided they retain the ability to co-ordinate on a large scale and maintain overall strategic unity.