Yet, camps can affect individuals only if they are aware of this institution. This was most likely the case because the concentration camps and their purpose were not hidden from the local population; rather, they were prominently and proudly publicized (Gellately 2001). This was particularly true in Germany, where the concentration camps were mostly labor camps rather than extermination or transit camps.¹

The selection of sites for concentration camps [under Fascism] was mostly driven by economic reasons, such as proximity to a quarry, a mine, or some industry (Megargee 2009). Most prisoners worked outside the camps in factories, construction projects, farms, or coal mines, and often had to walk to their workplace or use public transport to get there.² This progressive interconnectedness made the camps and their conditions visible to locals.

For example, Wladimir Ostapenko, a survivor of the Neuengamme concentration camp, explained that a local farmer would regularly pick up the ashes from the crematorium to use as fertilizer. There are also photos that show locals going on family walks near the camp grounds.³ Sofsky (1997) refers to the fact that locals were often involved in helping capture escaped prisoners, which further suggests both knowledge and contact.

Furthermore, local papers were used to spread [Fascist] propaganda about the camps (Ast 2013), displaying pictures of “typical” subhumans of other races with deformities, and calling for more camps for “those with hydrocephalus, cross‐eyed, deformed half‐Jews, and a whole series of racially inferior types” (Gellately 2001, 65).⁴

[…]

Applying cognitive dissonance theory to exposure to concentration camps suggests that individuals with relatively tolerant views of out‐groups are likely to be confronted with psychological discomfort when living close to a camp. This occurs because the camp provides new information, discordant with the individuals’ prior beliefs, that out‐group members are subhumans and can be mistreated.

Although eliminating the camp is not an option for the individuals, one way in which they can reduce the unpleasant feeling of dissonance in this situation is to change their beliefs about out‐groups. Local Germans had to rationalize the discrimination, enslavement, violence, and other inhumane treatment of people held in these camps, even if some of them had previously been their neighbors. A way to do so was to change individuals’ beliefs about the prisoners in these camps, to accept their status as out‐groups, subhumans, and not worthy of the same rights.

Some of this rationalization was necessary no matter where in the Third Reich an individual lived (Voigtländer and Voth 2015). However, as we argued above, the key difference that we capture in our study is that Germans who resided near concentration camps had to rationalize a more extreme example of intolerance than other Germans.⁵ This enhanced rationalization effort led those living near the camps to maintain higher levels of out‐group intolerance.⁶

[…]

Differences in political tolerance and attitudes toward out‐group members are often explained by contemporary forces. Building on the seminal work on political tolerance by Sullivan et al. (1981), we therefore account for individual‐level political ideology (ten‐point scale), employment status, education level,²³ and district‐level unemployment rate as well as level of urbanity.²⁴

We paid special attention to economic variables because the economic base of the areas surrounding the camps might have relied more heavily on manufacturing jobs than other parts of the country. This could have made these areas more vulnerable to economic depression in recent decades, which in turn might have led to perceptions of out‐group threat (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch 2016). By accounting for the economic variables with the sequential g‐estimator, we can recover the controlled direct effect of proximity to the camps net of current economic dynamics.

[…]

We argued that the patterns observed above likely result from processes of cognitive dissonance triggered by proximity to the camps during the Third Reich. This argument implies that the pre‐existing attitudes among individuals living close to the camps were not systematically different from those living elsewhere, and that it was the mental discomfort produced by this new social environment that led them to update their beliefs.

While plausible, this mechanism is hard to demonstrate because a direct test of it would require a careful microlevel analysis of individuals who witnessed this period. Such data are not available, which is why prior work on historical legacies has generally not tested the mechanism at all. We aspire to do more, and offer an alternative strategy to assess the plausibility of this segment of our argument.

If cognitive dissonance is responsible for the relationship uncovered, individuals living in areas that were more supportive of the [NSDAP] before the creation of the camps should experience less cognitive dissonance. For these individuals, there should be less of a need to reconcile their pre‐existing beliefs with the new social environment. Consequently, the effects of proximity to camps should be smaller. We test this implication by interacting our key predictor in the main analysis (distance to camp) with support for the [NSDAP] in 1933.

The plots in Figure 2 present the marginal effects of distance to camp on out‐group intolerance (left panel), immigrant resentment (central panel), and support for far‐right parties (right panel), conditional on the vote share obtained by the [NSDAP] in the last contested election of the Weimar Republic.³⁶ In line with our expectations, the camp proximity effects are large and statistically significant in regions that previously had low levels of [Fascist] support.

However, for all three outcome variables this effect decreases as [Fascist] support increases, and is no longer distinguishable from zero in districts with 50% or more support for the [NSDAP]. These results are consistent with the argument that cognitive dissonance links [Fascist] camps to contemporary intolerance, although they do not represent direct evidence for the mechanism proposed. Therefore, the findings should be interpreted as suggestive.³⁷

1940: The Fascist occupation of Paris commenced, and seven hundred and twenty‐eight Polish political prisoners from Tarnów became the Auschwitz concentration camp’s first inmates. Similarly, the Theresienstadt concentration camp’s first inmates in Czechoslovakia arrived.
2007: Kurt Josef Waldheim, Axis intelligence officer and latter Secretary‐General of the United Nations, finally dropped dead.