I agree. I think there’s two considerations that could flip Russia.
Military exhaustion. If the US can create a viable strategic threat to Russia, Russia may choose junior partner status over war. I think this is unlikely given the USA’s performance in Ukraine, but I know these games are played at the intelligence level and the USA may still be able to show Russian intelligence some form of dangerous strategic threat either in domestic irregulars or to Russia’s interests in Africa and SE Asia.
Financial gain for a younger faction of Russian bourgeoisie. Euromaidan showed us that despite decades of anti-West sentiment and Western duplicity, there was still enough support in Ukraine for a Western rapprochement. I imagine there is likely a faction in Russia that is similar. If the USA can offer junior imperial status to them, it might convince them to seize power. I think this unlikely due to the failure of Western sanctions but it’s possible that some of the younger and willing bourgeoisie are in fact hurting and that the older bourgeoisie are dominating the partnerships with China. These would be conditions that could cause such a realignment.
I also think that military exhaustion on part of Russia seems like a highly unlikely scenario at this point. Also, I would be shocked if China didn’t end up stepping in if it came to that. Losing Russia as a shield in the west would be absolutely catastrophic for China.
I also don’t see the dynamics for any sort of Euromaidan in Russia. Ukraine was in a completely different situation economically and politically when the coup happened. In fact, three years of war facilitated purging any real dissent within Russia. A great illustration of that was the whole Prigozhin mutiny where everyone immediately declared their support for the government. It’s also notable that public sector plays a dominant role in Russian economy now, so the power of the oligarchs is much diminished from the peak in the 90s.
I also think that military exhaustion on part of Russia seems like a highly unlikely scenario at this point. Also, I would be shocked if China didn’t end up stepping in if it came to that.
I think the problem with this is that such a threat likely wouldn’t be something China could step in on. It would either be a long-range threat that could devastate Russia or it would be a network threat - human or digital, something that could infiltrate or already has infiltrated, and could be activated to cause deep, wide-spread devastation. Think Stuxnet at a national scale.
three years of war facilitated purging any real dissent within Russia
I think that’s probably correct, but there’s always reactionary movement to anything like this. I’m of the belief that the Prigozhin incident was honey pot for a Western-involved sleeper movement, and that Prigozhin, wittingly or unwittingly, smoked out the most dangerous and hidden elements of infiltration in that mutiny, and the whole thing was stage managed by Russian intelligence for that explicit purpose.
I still think we should remain vigilant observers for anything that could look like rapprochement, but your brief assessment puts me a bit more at ease.
I agree. I think there’s two considerations that could flip Russia.
Military exhaustion. If the US can create a viable strategic threat to Russia, Russia may choose junior partner status over war. I think this is unlikely given the USA’s performance in Ukraine, but I know these games are played at the intelligence level and the USA may still be able to show Russian intelligence some form of dangerous strategic threat either in domestic irregulars or to Russia’s interests in Africa and SE Asia.
Financial gain for a younger faction of Russian bourgeoisie. Euromaidan showed us that despite decades of anti-West sentiment and Western duplicity, there was still enough support in Ukraine for a Western rapprochement. I imagine there is likely a faction in Russia that is similar. If the USA can offer junior imperial status to them, it might convince them to seize power. I think this unlikely due to the failure of Western sanctions but it’s possible that some of the younger and willing bourgeoisie are in fact hurting and that the older bourgeoisie are dominating the partnerships with China. These would be conditions that could cause such a realignment.
I also think that military exhaustion on part of Russia seems like a highly unlikely scenario at this point. Also, I would be shocked if China didn’t end up stepping in if it came to that. Losing Russia as a shield in the west would be absolutely catastrophic for China.
I also don’t see the dynamics for any sort of Euromaidan in Russia. Ukraine was in a completely different situation economically and politically when the coup happened. In fact, three years of war facilitated purging any real dissent within Russia. A great illustration of that was the whole Prigozhin mutiny where everyone immediately declared their support for the government. It’s also notable that public sector plays a dominant role in Russian economy now, so the power of the oligarchs is much diminished from the peak in the 90s.
I think the problem with this is that such a threat likely wouldn’t be something China could step in on. It would either be a long-range threat that could devastate Russia or it would be a network threat - human or digital, something that could infiltrate or already has infiltrated, and could be activated to cause deep, wide-spread devastation. Think Stuxnet at a national scale.
I think that’s probably correct, but there’s always reactionary movement to anything like this. I’m of the belief that the Prigozhin incident was honey pot for a Western-involved sleeper movement, and that Prigozhin, wittingly or unwittingly, smoked out the most dangerous and hidden elements of infiltration in that mutiny, and the whole thing was stage managed by Russian intelligence for that explicit purpose.
I still think we should remain vigilant observers for anything that could look like rapprochement, but your brief assessment puts me a bit more at ease.