

I’d personally argue this is the biggest reversal, bar none other, in terms of the contrast between the first Cold War and this new cold war. The more ascetic leftists may be rather put off by this dynamic but it is a paradigm shift that places the West in the dilemma the 20th century socialist bloc was held under, which the (now late) Michael Parenti articulated in “Blackshirts and Reds.”
The human capacity for discontent should not be underestimated. People cannot live on the social wage alone. Once our needs are satisfied, then our wants tend to escalate, and our wants become our needs. A rise in living standards often incites a still greater rise in expectations. As people are treated better, they want more of the good things and are not necessarily grateful for what they already have. Leading professionals who had attained relatively good living standards wanted to dress better, travel abroad, and enjoy the more abundant life styles available to people of means in the capitalist world.
It was this desire for greater affluence rather than the quest for political freedom that motivated most of those who emigrated to the West. Material wants were mentioned far more often than the lack of democracy. […]
[…] In 1989, I asked the GDR ambassador in Washington, D.C. why his country made such junky two-cylinder cars. He said the goal was to develop good public transportation and discourage the use of costly private vehicles. But when asked to choose between a rational, efficient, economically sound and ecologically sane mass transportation system or an automobile with its instant mobility, special status, privacy, and personal empowerment, the East Germans went for the latter, as do most people in the world. The ambassador added ruefully: “We thought building a good society would make good people. That’s not always true.” Whether or not it was a good society, at least he was belatedly recognizing the discrepancy between public ideology and private desire.











Only if Taiwan pursues any unilateral moves. It’s up to the CPC to determine whether those moves, whether allowing US military occupation, pursuing nuclear proliferation or outright secession, meets its “red line” for action.
Personally, I’ve always held the view that Taiwan is a big kabuki theater. Talking to geopolitically minded Chinese comrades about it gives you the impression that “Taiwan reunification” is the biggest case of inter-generational blue balls in modern history. Akin to the highly anticipated and fear-mongered, but ultimately merely rhetorical, liberation of West Berlin in the original Cold War.
Pragmatically speaking, China (or rather, socialist China) benefits from the contrast that Taiwan brings. It’s the fabled, fantasized alternate “democratic free” China pursuing electoralism and all the Western hurrah words, manifested dialectically in reality. Yet all of that only evidently amounting to a population where a large portion simply wishes they were Japanese instead. All the while being poorer nowadays than many of the likes of their Shanghai or Shenzhen counterparts. It could be said that it’s perhaps preferable for the CPC to maintain Taiwan as a reverse East German-style foil and that the CPC ultimately found a way to make lemonade out of lemons through the present state of the Taiwan status quo.
Geopolitically speaking, Taiwan has been relatively “worthless” historically. It says quite a lot that in spite of being a strait away from one of the oldest polities in human history, the first group to formally incorporate the island was Spain. The only use of the island is as a base against mainland China, which is why the Ming retreated to the island following the establishment of the Qing (later indeed using the island as an attack vector during the Revolt of the Three Feudatories) and the KMT followed in the Ming’s footsteps. In a purely geopolitical stance, China doesn’t need to necessarily possess the island itself, only merely prevent any hostile actors (the ROC itself, the West, Japan, etc.) from weaponizing the island as a dagger against the mainland.
The way that the Japanese/American-occupied Ryukyus and the Philippines’ Batanes islands juts toward Taiwan like pincers means that possessing Taiwan itself without addressing the former would not fundamentally solve the issue of China’s access beyond the “First Island Chain.” As such, any war for Taiwan without addressing the wider regional status quo of American control would merely be kicking the can down the road from a geopolitical standpoint.