The expansion of the Abraham Accords into Central Asia puts US influence in the region at risk, with strategic implications for Iran.

By: Xavier Villar

The November 6 summit between the United States and the Central Asian countries, held at the leaders’ level under the C5+1 platform and hosted by the White House, represents the most significant and largest meeting between the two sides since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The C5+1 format brings together the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—along with the United States, represented by the Secretary of State. Since its creation in 2015, this mechanism has served as a channel for coordinating economic, security, and connectivity agendas, although its impact to date has been limited.

The magnitude of this summit demanded both symbolic and substantive results. For months, the six nations involved held technical negotiations and intense diplomatic exchanges to lay the groundwork for the agreements announced in Washington. The result was contracts and memoranda of understanding worth more than $100 billion, a figure Washington presents as proof of its renewed commitment to a region where its influence has noticeably declined in recent years.

Beyond these economic announcements—designed in part to challenge Russia’s historical hegemony and contain China’s growing presence—what has truly garnered attention is Kazakhstan’s “incorporation” into the Abraham Accords, an attempt to transform a platform conceived for West Asia into a transregional pact. This initiative introduces Central Asia into geopolitical dynamics typical of Southwest Asia, altering traditional strategic balances.

From a regional perspective, this move cannot be understood solely as a US diplomatic advance, but also as an effort to align Central Asian countries with agendas that respond more to Washington’s interests than to their own historical patterns of integration. Central Asia’s growing energy and trade connectivity with Iran—through north-south corridors and new routes linking the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf—offers these states a more stable and less politically constrained alternative.

Failure and the strategic shift

Before examining the expansion into Central Asia, it is necessary to place it within the broader context of the Abraham Accords in their original setting. Promoted as an initiative capable of transforming relations between Israel and the Arab world, the accords have revealed structural limitations, both diplomatic and political. Far from stably integrating Israel into its environment, the perception of the Israeli state as a regional threat not only persists but has intensified in several instances.

The missile attack on Qatar laid bare the reality of Israel’s plan for the region: to attempt to erode all regional sovereignty in order to position itself as the sole dominant power. The incident, which affected a key US ally and a strategic financial center in the Gulf, demonstrates that the logic of deterrence and confrontation continues to define the regional dynamic. For many Arab governments, Israel’s capacity to act unilaterally confirms the limitations of existing agreements.

Faced with this impasse, Washington and Tel Aviv have sought new arenas where the political costs of normalization are lower and where the agreements can project renewed symbolic capital. Central Asia thus emerges as an alternative playing field, where the narrative of success is being revived, albeit more as propaganda than as substantive diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s historical relationship with Israel since the 1990s puts any progress in normalization presented as new into perspective, transforming its adherence into a symbolic gesture intended to bolster the image of the pact.

The United States’ motives: From “pacification” to "order building "

The US administration is balancing personal ambitions and institutional objectives in expanding the Agreements. While the president seeks tangible achievements to bolster his legacy, the national security apparatus pursues the expansion of the pact as a tool for projecting strategic and economic influence.

Following the failure of its most ambitious “pacification” plans in the Middle East, the Trump administration is seeking to project its influence on a new geopolitical map. Analysts like Victor Becker have identified Azerbaijan and Armenia as potential candidates, integrating the South Caucasus peace processes into a larger puzzle aimed at strengthening the narrative of the Peace Accords and consolidating the United States’ position in strategically sensitive regions.

The expansion into Central Asia, however, reflects more of a propaganda exercise than a genuine diplomatic advance. The choice of Kazakhstan stems from calculations of low political cost and high symbolic benefit for Washington and Tel Aviv, while Iran’s reaction remains a decisive strategic factor.

The Israeli perspective: Pragmatism and subsidiary hegemony

For Israel, the Abraham Accords are a pragmatic instrument, rather than a project for regional transformation. Some Israeli political and media sectors emphasize that the pact allows them to counter Iranian influence and strengthen Israel’s position in the region, but others view with suspicion that the expansion into Central Asia could dilute the exclusivity of its influence, subordinating it to the American agenda.

The inclusion of Kazakhstan and other actors is perceived more as a symbolic reinforcement of the Accords’ narrative than a genuine strategic transformation, given that these relationships have existed since the 1990s. Expanding the pact allows Israel to secure strategic supplies and adopt a more aggressive approach toward Iran, consolidating a limited regional hegemony dependent on the United States. From the Iranian perspective, the initiative demonstrates that, despite US and Israeli efforts, Israel has failed to neutralize Tehran’s regional influence.

The Central Asian approach: multi-alignment and cost calculation Central Asian governments are adopting a pragmatic strategy of multialignment, prioritizing autonomy in the face of external pressures. For Kazakhstan, adherence to certain international initiatives does not imply significant commitments, as formal “normalization” with Israel has existed since 1992. However, from the US perspective, this is interpreted as an increase in Central Asia’s strategic status in Washington’s global policy.

In a context of international polarization, these nations are carefully balancing their foreign policy: maintaining actions that do not exceed the tolerance of Moscow, Beijing, or Tehran, while projecting a degree of acceptance to the West. This approach was reflected in Tokayev’s visit to Moscow after the summit, reinforcing agreements as a counterweight to the Kremlin and ensuring the preservation of strategic ties with Iran.

Regional public opinion and recent events in the Middle East also influence decision-making. For Kazakhstan, deepening cooperation with the West is seen as a short-term tactical measure, while cautious rhetoric toward Iran allows it to control domestic costs and avoid regional tensions, thus reaffirming its commitment to a sovereign geopolitical balance.

Consequences for Iran

For Iran, the expansion of the Agreements to its northeastern border represents a strategic challenge. While Kazakhstan’s membership may seem symbolic, it underestimates the medium-term implications: it paves the way for the entry of more strategically relevant actors, such as Saudi Arabia; it creates support networks for Israel under US cover; and it projects a counterweight to Russian and Chinese influence in the region.

Tehran must carefully monitor the pressure on countries like Tajikistan, the erosion of its position in key transport corridors, the creation of strategic economic interdependencies, offensive security pacts, proxy actions, and biased mediation roles. While the immediate establishment of Israeli bases is not expected, the consolidation of Israeli influence could gradually erode Iran’s strategic advantages.

While the Abraham Accords have shown relative failure, the maneuvers of the United States and Israel in Central Asia pose a risk to regional stability. For Iran, anticipating and countering these moves from their earliest stages is crucial to preserving its strategic depth and protecting its interests. Tehran’s ability to strengthen alliances, consolidate economic corridors, and maintain geopolitical equilibrium will determine its room for maneuver, as the window of opportunity for its diplomacy and strategy could rapidly narrow if Israeli and American influence is allowed to consolidate unchecked.