Quoting Jean Ziegler’s The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead, pages 13–4:

Switzerland [in 1940] was now integrated de facto into the Reichsdeutsch economic area. […] It is estimated that, in the years 1941–42, 60 percent of the Swiss munitions industry, 50 percent of the optical industry, and 40 percent of the engineering industry were working for the Reich.

[…]

Swiss industrial exports to the Reich were not fully offset by German deliveries: the Swiss Confederation granted Berlin nloans, or so‐called compensation credits. […] By the war’s end these credits amounted to 1,119 billion Swiss francs. […]

Where the Reich was concerned, Switzerland fulfilled an important function in the gold market. [The Reich] needed foreign currency in order to purchase strategic raw materials, even from allies like Romania. Most countries, including neutrals such as Sweden and Portugal, declined to accept German gold, so the Reich’s gold and foreign exchange transactions could be effected with Switzerland alone.

Page 36:

Switzerland, the world’s only neutral financial center of truly international standing, accepted [the Third Reich’s] looted gold throughout the war years in payment for industrial goods or as bullion that was fenced and laundered and exchanged for foreign currency or traded off in other financial cnters under new, “Swiss” identity.

But for Switzerland’s financial serrvices and the willing fences of Bern, the zealous [capitalists], [the Third Reich] would not have been able to wage [its] rapacious wars of conquest. Swiss bankers supplied [it] with the requisite foreign exchange. It was they who financed [the Third Reich’s] wars of aggression.

Regula Ludi’s Reparations for Nazi Victims in Postwar Europe, page 151:

Among the foreign customers were many Jews who felt harassed by their own governments. But with its notorious underregulation, Switzerland’s financial market also was predestined to become the hub for money laundering and clandestine transactions, especially when economic warfare measures started restricting financial activity in belligerent states. Many assets that ended up in Switzerland during the Second World War were likely to become a postwar liability because either their owners perished or they stemmed from Nazi robbery.

The exodus of capital from the Third Reich caused particular nervousness with the Allies. Capital flight and the cloaking of [Axis] investments abroad risked obstructing collective security goals outlined at the Yalta Conference, in particular the prevention of a [Fascist] resurgence and Germany’s renewed rise as a threat to world peace.

(Emphasis added in all cases.)

For a longer overview, see Glen Yeadon’s and John Hawkins’ The Nazi Hydra in Fascist America, pages 446–55. For Swiss capitalists’ obstinate reluctance to compensate Jews, see Leora Bilsky’s The Holocaust, Corporations, and the Law: Unfinished Business, pages 36–8.