(Mirror.)

With Antonescu’s ascension to power, the relationship between [the Third Reich] and [the Kingdom of] Romania warmed considerably. Antonescu began by promising closer collaboration with [the Third Reich]. He also renewed the request for German military assistance, with the idea of having Germans train and reorganize the Romanian army.

This time, Hitler agreed and on September 19, 1940, he decided to send a military mission to [the Kingdom of] Romania. The improvement in relations would culminate on November 23, 1940, with [the Kingdom of] Romania’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact.⁶

To be precise, [the Third Reich] actually sent four missions to [this Kingdom]. The umbrella organization was the [Third Reich’s] military mission, commanded by Army General Erik Hansen, who was also the military attaché to Bucharest. Hansen also commanded the [Wehrmacht] mission (Deutsches Heeres Mission in Rümanien, or DHM) to [the Kingdom of] Romania.

The next major element was the [Luftwaffe] mission (Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission in Rümanien, or DLM), commanded by Luftwaffe Lieutenant General Wilhelm Speidel. The final part of the military mission was the [Kriegsmarine] mission, headed by Admiral W. Tillesen.⁷ This article looks at the activities of the DLM to a small degree, but the major focus will be on the DHM.

[…]

The DLM had two principal missions. The first was to create air defenses around the vital oil region of [the Kingdom of] Romania in the vicinity of Ploiești and the Black Sea port of Constanța. Also involved was the regulation of air space over the defended areas. The second mission was to modernize the Romanian air force. The DLM was more successful in completing the first mission. Speidel and his staff were able to use both Romanian and German matériel and procedures to make Ploiești one of the most heavily defended targets against air attacks.

This was to prove invaluable in the initial Romanian participation in Operation Barbarossa. Between late June and mid‐October 1941, Ploiești and Constanța were attacked 91 times by Soviet aircraft. Led by the efforts of the Luftwaffe’s Jagd Geschwader 52, the combined [Axis] defense brought down some 81 Soviet aircraft.⁹

[…]

Like the DLM, the DHM had two missions. Aside from the training mission, the [Third Reich’s] units were to assist the Romanian force in erecting defenses against a possible Soviet invasion, although the mere presence of [these] units in [the Kingdom of] Romania did act as a guarantee against further Soviet encroachments.

The second mission was to train the Romanian army up to a level that was as close to [the Fascist bourgeoisie’s] standards as possible. These units would play a part in the invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler had distinctly mentioned this in his December 5, 1940, speech to the heads of the Wehrmacht. Both Finland and [the Kingdom of] Romania are mentioned as possible allies in the execution of Operation Barbarossa in Hitler’s first official directive on the subject issued December 18, 1940.¹²

[…]

Training was conducted at the tactical and operational levels, at least in a theoretical sense. There was also an ideological aspect to the training.

Tactically, the [Third Reich] set up training centers for the Romanian 5th, 6th, 13th, 18th, and 20th infantry divisions as well as for the Romanian Panzer Division. These centers aimed at training Romanian soldiers in both German weapons and tactics. Later on in the spring of 1941, the [Third Reich] extended the training in a limited way to artillery.¹⁹ [It] also sought to improve the quality of Romanian general officers through education.

The DHM set up the equivalent of the German Kriegsakademie in [the Kingdom of] Romania. All aspirants for general officer rank were to take a 2‐year course of instruction. Like its German counterpart, the Romanian war college was tactically oriented and focused on division‐sized operations. The course was also aimed at producing officers who could undertake all staff and administrative functions associated with division and brigade operations. A course was also set up for general officers and older staff officers as well, lasting from 1 to 3 months.²⁰

As might be expected of such an effort mounted by [an empire] such as [the Third Reich], there was the previously mentioned ideological component to DHM activities. In a situation report, Hube noted that, in addition to the need for measures to be taken against corruption in the officer corps, friendly attitudes toward Great Britain and the Jews had to be eliminated. To aid this, [Fascist] German propaganda was disseminated that found a degree of receptivity in [the Kingdom of] Romania, although not as much as the [Third Reich] hoped.²¹

The various endeavors of the DHM brought about a record of mixed success.

(Emphasis added. For a summary of the Romanian army’s combat performance in 1941, click here.)

In the first phase of the campaign, Romanian performance might be regarded as satisfactory. The army was able to accomplish its task even though, in a number of places, the Romanians’ Soviet opponents were often better armed and equipped.

Even Colonel General Franz Halder, the chief of the German Army General Staff and no particular admirer of Romanian military prowess, confessed pleasant surprise at the initial performance of the Romanians. The liaison staff with the Romanian 1st Border Division thought well enough of the division’s conduct to submit the names of some 37 members for [Wehrmacht] awards.³¹

Things were much tougher in the second phase of the 1941 campaign. The Romanian Third and Fourth Armies were now required to undertake missions well beyond their normal operational radius. That often left them requiring logistical support from the German [Fascists], who were not always in a position to deliver it when needed. Dumitrescu’s Third Army narrowly avoided a deadly clash with the Hungarian Mobile Corps, which was also operating on that part of the front, thanks to the efforts of German liaison officers with both formations.³²

The siege of Odessa proved long and costly to the Romanian [anticommunists]. The Soviet High Command was able to keep the Independent Coastal Army, garrisoning Odessa, supplied by sea. That allowed the garrison to conduct an active and energetic defense. Several successful Soviet sorties forced the Fourth Army to fight repeatedly over the same ground in bloody assaults.

It was only after the Romanian [anticommunists] secured key points in the fortress’s defense system, combined with the threat of intervention by [the Third Reich’s] airpower on a massive scale, that the Soviets evacuated the city on October 15, 1941. Odessa’s occupation marked a clear end of the campaign for what was by that time an exhausted Romanian army.³³

Click here for other events that happened today (September 19).

1909: Ferdinand Anton Ernst Porsche, bourgeois Fascist, was born.
1939: The Battle of Kępa Oksywska concluded, with Polish losses reaching roughly 14% of all the forces engaged.
1940: Witold Pilecki was voluntarily captured and sent to Auschwitz to gather and smuggle out information for the resistance movement.
1942: The Axis brought some two thousand Jews to Mineralnye‐Vodi (from Esentuki) and exterminated them.
1944: The Battle of Hürtgen Forest commenced, and would become the longest individual battle that the U.S. Army has ever fought. (Coincidentally, the Moscow Armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed, which officially ended the Continuation War.)