Overall, Antonescu’s Armenian policy was both inconsistent and ambiguous. While the primary focus was upon Jews, the Antonescu régime persecuted Armenians, especially the Nansen Armenians [read: stateless Armenian refugees], primarily through restrictions on employment, real estate ownership, and conduct of business—although to a lesser extent than the Jews.

As an ultranationalist government, which aimed to construct a homogenous nation‐state (and to find a scapegoat for the threats posed by the revisionist neighbours, and for the problems of comparatively low participation of ethnic Romanians in the economy), Romanian official accusations against Armenians resembled some used by Turkish nationalists a few decades earlier, namely that they were disloyal to the state in favour of that dangerous eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union/Russia, that Armenian entrepreneurs took over vital sectors of the local economy, and sabotaged Romanianization by profiting from it and collaborating with the Jews.²⁰

The apparent contradictory nature of the anti‐Armenian accusations—that they belonged to the exploiting bourgeoisie and harboured pro‐Soviet sympathies—was nothing new among [the Axis’s] Romanian leaders (as well as among […] other [Axis] leaders), who did not seemed to be bothered by the contradictions of their antisemitic/racist worldviews.

Romanianization also resembled the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)’s and, later on, the Kemalists’ policy of creating a Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie through the confiscation of property from Armenians and Greeks and redistribution of assets to deserving Muslim beneficiaries. Thus, CUP and Kemalist leaders tried to address the under‐representation of Muslim/Turkish and over‐representation of Christian minorities among urbanites and middle‐class entrepreneurs.²¹

However, as one of the smallest Christian minorities of [the Kingdom of] Romania—Armenians were mostly affiliated with the Gregorian and Catholic Churches—they were viewed as less threatening than the Jews and were not targeted for deportation and mass murder.²² Nonetheless, they and particularly the Nansen Armenians were swept up in the hostility towards non‐Romanians.

[…]

Antonescu’s main obsession and fear was the threat posed by the Soviet Union and communism, and any suspicion about a group’s sympathy for the USSR triggered his hostility towards that community.

This happened with certain of the Nansen Armenians. The intention of some Nansen Armenians to emigrate to Soviet Armenia—in 1940 and 1941, repatriation applications were submitted to the MAI and the Soviet Legation in Bucharest by 400 individuals (possibly 1,000 families by other sources) and a committee was formed to pursue this issue as a result of a rumour that the government would persecute them like the Jews³⁵—was interpreted by the Antonescu régime as ultimate proof of disloyalty to [the Kingdom of] Romania and of allegiance to the Soviet Union.

Romanian officials failed to understand the desire of some Armenians to escape their uncertain refugee status and live in their own republic, even if this meant relocation to a state with worrying domestic policies. The Soviet Union was nevertheless a state that promised equality to all its citizens and seemed to be the main international protector of Armenians.³⁶

The Antonescu régime ignored the fact that only a tiny minority of Armenian refugees wanted to emigrate to the Soviet Union and that native Armenians and most Nansen Armenians opposed the idea of such ‘repatriation’, publicly criticizing the organization advocating emigration.³⁷ For Antonescu it was important that, just like some Jews, especially from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in 1940, certain Armenians wanted to live under the rule of its most threatening enemy, the Soviet Union.

While in the case of the former, their intention to return to their natal land and families took place during the war—accompanied by mass violence fostered by antisemitism, border changes, and rumours of war and domestic treason³⁸—the Armenians did not emigrate to the Soviet Union during the Antonescu régime.

In fact, as the Soviet troops approached Romania[n] borders (in late 1943 and early 1944), some wealthy Nansen Armenians planned to emigrate from [the Kingdom of] Romania to Egypt (via Turkey) in order to escape a future Soviet occupation and a [people’s republic].³⁹

Nevertheless, the mere discussion of potential emigration to the USSR and the submission of repatriation applications kept Nansen Armenians on Antonescu’s list of suspect groups under close surveillance.⁴⁰

[…]

While the régime spared Armenians from ‘too harsh and inhumane measures’ unlike […] towards the Jews, the hostility of Romanian officials towards Armenian businessmen continued.

During the 4 September 1943 government meeting, which debated various topics including the sugar industry, Ion Antonescu blamed minority tradesmen, including Armenians, for exploiting Romanian customers by selling them cheap sweets and thus making huge profits. According to Ion Antonescu, minority entrepreneurs speculated in the sugar produced from the sugar beet delivered by Romanian peasants, who received little benefit for their hard work.

Marshal I. Antonescu: The peasant cultivated sugar beet and bore all the risks and the sugar manufacturers and speculators are the ones who gain [the money]. Who are these speculators? […] They are not [ethnic] Romanians. In this way, the Romanian nation’s snag had been sucked away by certain foreigners who seized several economic fields, where they encountered little competition. There are a lot of Armenians, [insert slur here], Greeks and stinky [insert slur here] who opened sweet stores where they transform the sugar into dirty and tasteless candies […] That is why I am asking you to put this field under surveillance. All Armenians, all Greeks, the so‐called Macedonians […] are making commerce with sweets.⁵¹

As a highly urbanized and economically dynamic population, with a significant diaspora and international trade connections, Armenians were indeed over‐represented in the economy during that era. According to SSRCI’s data, Armenian entrepreneurs owned almost one per cent of [the Kingdom of] Romania’s industrial and commercial capital, while Armenians represented around 0.2 per cent of the country’s population.⁵² Armenians had an even larger share in specific economic fields, such as the textile industry (4.56 per cent) and the food industry (2.44 per cent).⁵³

[…]

Lacking ‘proper’ ethnicity, citizenship, or international protection, Nansen Armenians struggled not only with business and real estate interdictions, but also with labour restrictions.⁷¹ For instance, Cividian, a Nansen Armenian, managed to work legally only when the post‐Antonescu régime cancelled the xenophobic laws protecting ‘national labour’ even though he earned his college degree from the University of Iași in 1937.

‘I graduated from Iași [University and] in 1937 […] I was unemployed and I could not work. [Because of] the laws for the protection of national labour that functioned at that time […] We had Nansen passports […] not [real] passports, but Nansen identity cards. Therefore, we were foreigners.’⁷²

Somebody might think that the discrimination against Armenian businessmen was evidence of anticapitalism, but that would be a shallow conclusion. The goal of harassing Armenian capitalists was not to reduce capital, the law of value, or generalised commodity production, but to reduce competition, something that capitalists loathe, and thereby secure Romanian businesses.