As described above, reactions to the Defense Act of 1925 were strong among conservatives and the king. But the most widespread discontent was within the military (Argenziano 1995, 212; Nilsson 2000, 48; Lewin 2010, 83). Indeed, some higher military officers made an explicit connection between the process of democratization that Sweden had just gone through and the disarmament outcome (Nilsson 2000, 49).

In response to the Defense Act of 1925, the Association for the Defense of Sweden (Riksforbundet för Sveriges försvar, RSF) was formed by military officers to propagate for rearmament, and the association also established local organizations at garrisons threatened by closure (Argenziano 1995, 212; Lewin 2010, 83).

At the time, and in view of recent rise of fascism in Italy, these organizations were viewed by the Social Democratic leaders and the Social Democratic press as a highly worrisome development, who feared that these organizations would be used to “ferment fascism” and become “hotbeds of fascism” (Argenziano 1995, 212–213).

As we shall see below, the 1925 Defense Act and the issue of disarmament appear to have been very important to the small Swedish fascist movement that mobilized, largely around military officers, during the second half of the 1920s.

In 1926, three military officers (one of which was a veteran of the WWI German army) formed the Swedish Fascist People’s Party; this is the first incarnation of what would become the fascist party that we focus most of our attention on in the quantitative analysis below. The party quickly changed its name to the Swedish Fascist Combat Organization (Sveriges Fascistiska Kamporganisation, SFKO).

The first fascist party, the Swedish National Socialist Freedom League (Svenska nationalsocialistiska frihetsförbundet), which a few years later changed names to the Swedish National Socialist Farmers’ and Workers’ Association (Svenska nationalsocialistiska bonde‐ och arbetarföreningen, SNBA), had been formed two years earlier.

However, while the main impetus behind the first fascist party had been anti‐semitism, an issue that had not attracted supporters to the party, the SFKO gravitated more towards Italian fascism, and focused on anti‐democratic and anti‐communist rhetoric, and the issue of national defense (Wärenstam 1972; Hagtvet 1980).

According to Wärenstam (1972, 70), SFKO’s journal constantly wrote about the issue of national defense, and especially the cutbacks and garrison closures that resulted from the Defense Act of 1925. This issue was also connected to the issue of democracy and parliamentarism, as is exemplified by the following ‘call to soldiers’ published in the journal:

You have sworn allegiance to the Crown. But the king has been disabled by the party leaders. He who wishes to remain loyal to his oath must overthrow the system of government […] Throw parliamentarism from the saddle! Long live Sweden! Long live the King!

Long live fascism! (Wärenstam 1972, 75).

Hagtvet (1980, 726) summarizes historical evidence concerning the recruitment to SFKO as follows: “If there is any pattern in the recruitment to this organization, it must be that of the declassé military”. The explanation for this, Hagtvet says, is the 1925 Defense Act.

This was probably due to the reform of the armed forces completed by the Social Democratic Minister of Defense Per Albin Hansson. The military regarded this reform with suspicion. Some officers lost their commission, in itself a rather grave problem in view of the unemployment at the time. Fears, particularly among the lower ranks, that there would be further lay‐offs made some susceptible to the nationalist propaganda in fascist weeklies (Hagtvet 1980, 726).

Wärenstam (1972, 89) concludes along the same lines, saying that the government had not considered the “social consequences of the Defense Act of 1925”, most notably unemployment among military personnel, and that numerous lower‐rank military personnel were drawn to SFKO for this reason.

According to Nilsson (2000, 68), Per Engdahl, an early member of SFKO who later went on to establish his own fascist organization and became highly influential in the post‐World War II (WWII) fascist sub‐culture, has also testified that the Defense Act of 1925 was an important impetus behind the formation of SFKO.

[…]

The performance of the fascist parties in the 1936 elections can perhaps be partly explained by the emergence of a new competitor. The Swedish National League (Sveriges Nationella Förbund, SNF) originated from the youth organization of the Conservative Party (Allmäna Valmansförbundet, AV). The youth organization had, however, gradually oriented itself towards fascism, and positioned itself strongly against disarmament.¹⁹

During the late 1920s, the organization had seen a remarkable influx of members, which historians have argued was a result of popular disapproval of the Defense Act of 1925. As one leader in the organization put it, referring to the 1925 Defense Act: “The parliamentary outcome concerning the issue of defense served as a wake‐up call” (Wärenstam, 1965, 22–23). In 1934, the youth organization broke away from the traditional conservatives.

The following year, three members of parliament broke with AV and sat as representatives for SNF for their remaining terms. In the 1936 elections, SNF ran in 22 of the 28 districts and received 26,750 votes, or 0.9% of the total votes cast (Statistics Sweden 1936).

After the SNP had disbanded, Lindholm’s NSAP was the main remaining explicitly [pro‐Reich] party. With the growing reports of the persecution of Jews in [the Third Reich] and Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy stance, Lindholm felt the need to distance his party from the […] NSDAP. In 1938, he therefore changed the name of the party to Swedish Socialist Unity (Svensk Socialistisk Samling, SSS; Wärenstam 1972, 127–128). However, as Hagtvet (1980, 730) writes, “this shift was cosmetic in nature”.

In the 1938 municipal elections, Lindholm’s SSS ran in 108 of the around 1500 municipalities where single parties could run independently. In the municipalities with city status, they received 12,321 votes, or 1.2% in the 51 municipalities of this type where they ran.

As earlier, the geographical variation in votes was large with the party winning close to or over 2% of the votes in e.g. the municipalities of Gothenburg and Stockholm (Statistics Sweden 1938). The slightly smaller SNF also ran in the elections, presenting lists in 53 municipalities and receiving 7936 votes in the municipalities with city status (Statistics Sweden 1938).

Following the outbreak of WWII, [fascist] parties, although still being active, largely shunned electoral participation. There is evidence that they calculated that the outbreak of the war had diminished their prospects of electoral success even further, especially after the [Fascist] invasion of Norway in 1940. And with the end of WWII, parties associated with [classical] fascism almost disappeared from the electoral scene.

(Emphasis added.)