Although Fascist Italy had already established direct contact with several antirepublican movements, [the Third Reich] had some contact with fascist groups like the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional‐Sindicalista and the Falange, and even financed the right‐wing newspaper Informaciones, but did not see Spain as a priority.⁹

The Spanish Civil War gave Fascist Italy and [the Third Reich] the opportunity to expand their influence in the peninsula. [The Third Reich’s] cultural reach in Spain followed on earlier cultural diplomacy networks, including scientific and cultural exchanges, many of them centred on the Ibero‐American Institute in Berlin, the German–Spanish Society in Barcelona and the German schools.

Between 1910 and 1934, Germany received 25% of all Spanish researchers who received funding from the Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios to study abroad, becoming their second favourite destination, surpassed only by France, whose strong imprint over the Spanish Second Republic was not without tensions. Moreover, soon after their rise to power, the [German Fascists] transformed many, if not all, of Germany’s cultural and scientific institutions abroad into instruments of propaganda.¹⁰

It is, therefore, unsurprising that cultural diplomacy was to become the springboard of [the Third Reich’s] propagandistic activities in Spain.

In early 1936, Wilhelm Faupel, director of the Ibero‐American Institute, became the head of the German–Spanish Society. This appointment was highly significant because the Society not only arranged academic exchanges but also directly supported the foreign section of the Falange — the Spanish fascist party — in Berlin.

Furthermore, Faupel’s appointment as special ambassador to Franco confirmed the temporary success of the Reich Propaganda Ministry’s (Promi) strategy in Spain, which prioritized contact with the Falange, over the German Foreign Ministry’s desire to focus on Franco and his cabinet. In fact, after subdued activity during the Second Republic, Faupel’s leadership and the society’s dependence on the Promi allowed it to increase its budget considerably.

Over the course of the civil war, the German–Spanish Society came to welcome the heads of Hisma‐Rowak — the industrial complex that monopolized German–Spanish trade — to its board, showcasing the connection between propagandistic, cultural and economic interests.¹¹

[…]

Up until Danzi’s replacement by Carlo Bossi, fascist propaganda had two key aims: fascistize Spain and win the war. But there was also a desire, very early on, to limit [Reich] influence in Spain, despite the fact that Mussolini and Hitler had already started to coordinate their support for Franco in August 1936.²⁵ As Cantalupo was told upon his appointment as ambassador, ‘You will work with the Germans against the Germans’.²⁶ For Fascist Italy, any sort of Nazification could take place only to their detriment.

Although Fascist Italy had good reason to be concerned by the [Reich’s] presence in Spain, [Berlin] — although careful not to allow Italian influence to surpass its own²⁷ — had, in principle and in propaganda terms, a more international objective in mind. In the words of Berhardt Taubert, they aimed to ‘“assume leadership of a powerful [gewaltig] global force” dedicated to the extirpation of international Bolshevism’²⁸ and the Spanish Civil War presented a golden opportunity to do so.

The Antikomintern was in charge of exploiting the conflict internationally, portraying it as proof of the Soviets’ global subversive activities. This organization had been created in 1933 to lead the propaganda fight against Bolshevism on the international scene. With this objective in mind, the Third Reich fostered the emergence, in as many countries as possible, of Antikomintern organizations, which, though they were closely related to [Berlin’s] foreign policy, appeared to be independent.

The Spanish branch published a fortnightly Spanish language newssheet, Informaciones Antibolcheviques, organized exhibitions and radio broadcasts, supported nationalist propaganda in republican‐held areas and advised Franco’s director of propaganda at the front.²⁹

The organization worked along two lines: to supply the rebel Army with anti‐communist materials and to gather materials on the fight against Bolshevism in Spain in order to strengthen the anti‐communist campaign abroad. In this sense, the Antikomintern was more interested in placing the Spanish Civil War at the centre of their anti‐Bolshevik campaign abroad than spreading the ideals of [German Fascism] as such.³⁰

[…]

What is clear, however, is that language learning was central to both [the Third Reich] and [Fascist] Italy, not only because it brought Spain culturally and ideologically closer to the Axis but because of its commercial value.⁸⁹ Here, once again, the dividing line between propaganda, cultural diplomacy and commercial interest seemed to evaporate.

In this sense, both nations were also aware that translations and continued exports of books to Spain served to make inroads into the Latin‐American market. Significantly, [the Third Reich] refused to grant Spain a monopoly over the translation of German books to Spanish.⁹⁰

Matters improved further for the Axis when the Francoist régime made German and Italian mandatory foreign languages in high school, which helped to erode French influence. This measure, and the willing collaboration of Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, head of the Instituto España, further facilitated the Axis strategy of increasing book imports, which now found a greater number of willing readers. It seems, however, that his actions tended to benefit [Rome] much more than [Berlin].⁹¹

In any case, the cultural and economic value of this strategy stoked fascist competitiveness. Italy increased imports of books — 117,565 in 1938 alone, extended invitations to political and professional elites to visit Italy, provided scholarships and published the journal Legiones y falanges in collaboration with FET.

[…]

As the war approached its end, the Axis sought to play a part in the reconstruction of Spain. Propaganda and cultural policy were soon mobilized in the interest of economic opportunism. [Rome] grew increasingly wary of [Berlin’s] activities in this area: ‘the few businesses that are there, they [the Germans] want to do it themselves and for that purpose they have invaded the country with an army of traveling salesmen’.¹⁰² In fact, many cultural exchanges were intended to ensure [Rome’s] participation in the reconstruction effort.¹⁰³

However, here the German [Fascist]s proved to be strong competitors, particularly thanks to the rapid expansion of the HISMA‐ROWAK industrial complex and, according to Stohrer, their superior advertising work.¹⁰⁴

To try and fight [Berlin] for a piece of the Spanish market, the MMIS proposed to organize an exhibition in order to showcase the military and media technical equipment they could provide to the Spaniards. Competition with the German [Fascist]s in terms of price and technology is probably one of the reasons why the Italian [Fascist]s donated so much equipment to Spain upon leaving the country at the end of the war. Donations that, incidentally, would harm their own performance in the Second World War.

In the coming years, looking to curtail the increasing [Reich] influence over the Spanish rebels, [Rome] designed a broad cultural program with a budget of 70,000 lire centralized in the new Istituto Italiano de Cultura established in Madrid. [Rome’s] investment, however, would be halted with the outbreak of the Second World War.¹⁰⁵ In [Berlin’s] case, though, Lazar’s continued presence in Spain between 1938 and 1945 increased the reach of [Reich] propaganda and cultural diplomacy to new heights…that is, until things started to go wrong for the Axis.¹⁰⁶

(Emphasis added.)