Jacomoni and company aimed to straddle several possibly conflicting interests while governing Albania. First, Albania was an imperial possession meant to strengthen [Fascism’s] economic and geostrategic position. Second, the [Fascist] administration would highlight the universalism of imperial fascism to Albanians and foreign observers. In this sense, Albania was a test site for what Reto Hofmann has called fascism’s alleged ability to foster capitalist development with internal social peace through a disciplined politics of nationalism (2017).

Third, [Rome] would have to balance a plethora of Albanian interest groups. Large landowners were embraced rather than erased through land redistribution. Without a socio‐economic revolution, many poor and rural Albanians would have to content themselves with the ‘development’ typical of interwar imperialism — a higher possibility of accessing education, transportation infrastructure and medical assistance (Fischer 1999, 62–70).

The nationalist élites and middle classes willing to work with [Fascism] were split between those who had opposed Zog and those who had supported him. [Rome] tried to appeal to both, which created inevitable tensions. More radical nationalists also hoped to leverage the [Fascist] empire into Albanian irredentist expansionism at the expense of Balkan neighbours. Upon [officially joining] the [Axis], [Rome] sought to justify its own expansionist agenda through Albanian claims while ensuring that a ‘Greater Albania’ coincided with [Fascist] interests.

[…]

[Fascist] policy in Albania consistently borrowed from practices in Italy itself. A telling example of this was the extension of colonie estive (summer camps) to Albanian children. These camps had long been employed by the régime for two main purposes. The first was to strengthen its hold over the youth. Second, the camps aimed at therapeutic and prophylactic intervention, especially for working‐class children. The régime continually expanded the programme.

In 1939, over 800,000 Italian children participated in a camp. Italian children living abroad were also included — 15,000 of these attended camps in 1935 (Dogliani 2014, 181–182). Despite their questionable results, bringing emigrant Italian children to Italy, often for the first time, was a key component in the broader [Fascist] attempt to maintain institutional supervision and ideological sympathy among Italians abroad (Pretelli 2010, 123–126).

Albania offered an opportunity to expand the inclusion of emigrant Italians to an imperial population. Not only did the [Fascists] immediately apply this programme to Albanians, but they did so ambitiously, sending 10,000 Albanian children to beach camps in Bari, Ancona, Rimini, Venice and Trieste in the summer of 1940. The goals were to teach Albanian children hygiene, elementary Italian, basic weapons training for boys and fascist songs while instilling a sense of pride through the wearing of uniforms.²³

The Italian representative in the Albanian Fascist Party, Piero Parini, argued that the programme was a success, highlighting the fact that the children came from all over Albania and served as local representatives of the benefits of [Fascist] rule. According to Parini, the Albanian children looked like Italian fascist youth on the exterior.²⁴

For Parini, this was a start. Some Albanian parents also sent letters of thanks, including one signed by 22 parents from the village of Ocisti. While the official documents skew our view of these camps, an analysis of the records reveals some of the concerns raised by [Fascist] administrators.

(Emphasis added.)