Pictured: ‘Representatives of the governments of Italy, Germany, and Japan sign the Three Power Pact, establishing the Rome–Berlin–Tokyo Axis. Seated left to right are: Galeazzo Ciano (Italy), Joachim von Ribbentrop (Germany), and the Japanese ambassador, Kurusu.’ (Source.)

Quoting Christian Goeschel’s Performing the New Order: The Tripartite Pact, 1940–1945:

On 27 September 1940, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan signed the tripartite pact in Berlin. The signatories committed to ‘assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino‐Japanese conflict’. The pact was a warning to the USA not to enter the wars in Europe and China. But [Washington] immediately saw the pact as the formal confirmation of Japan’s belligerence and so increased its military involvement in the Pacific.¹

The tripartite pact built on existing treaties, including the military alliance between Italy and Germany, formalized in the 1939 Pact of Steel, and the German–Japanese Anti‐Comintern pact, concluded in 1936 and joined by Italy in 1937. Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (the latter country albeit only for twelve days) and then the Independent State of Croatia joined the tripartite pact subsequently, but the three main signatories denied the accessory states equal rank, thereby perpetuating their idea of a strictly hierarchical world order.²

[The Third Reich’s] non‐aggression pact with the Soviet Union in late August 1939 had greatly upset [Tōkyō]. But as the June 1940 defeat of France by [the Third Reich] had demonstrated, the defeat of liberal democracy seemed within reach of the Axis powers.³

At first the alliance with Imperial Japan may looking puzzling, especially given that the German Fascists had mixed feelings on the Japanese, but given Imperial Japan’s fierce competition with liberal colonialism and its militant anticommunism, an alliance was too good to pass up:

Germany and Italy had previously maintained close links with China, but Japan’s increasing undermining of the liberal–internationalist order helped raise the possibility for the [Fascist] dictatorships to expand their territories.⁵

Pictured: ‘German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (standing at right), addresses the audience gathered to witness the signing of the Three Power Pact, establishing the Rome–Berlin–Tokyo Axis. Seated from left to right are: the Japanese Ambassador Kurusu, Galeazzo Ciano (Italy), and German Chancellor Adolf Hitler.’ (Source.)

The signing of the pact was a triumph for Hitler. While he regarded the Japanese as racially inferior, he admired Japanese military achievements such as the 1905 victory over Russia. He saw an alliance with Nippon in strategic terms, or at least that is what he told his entourage in May 1942 when Germany, Japan and Italy dominated large swaths of Europe, East and Southeast Asia and North Africa.²³ Moreover, because of his racist views, he did not agree with Japan’s aim to drive European colonial powers from Asia; yet in this case he was prepared to subsume his racist principles to strategic considerations.²⁴

The pact’s signing in Berlin underlined Germany’s preponderant position in the alliance at the time. Despite the fanfare, reactions in Britain and the United States were cool overall. Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo, drily stated that the pact ‘may be a diplomatic success for Germany’, but he could not see how Tokyo would benefit from it.²⁵

Soon afterwards, in January 1941, the American historian A. Whitney Griswold commented on the pact in Foreign Affairs. For him, the pact had been Germany’s brainchild. Europe still held the reins over East Asian matters. The Times, while warning against the tripartite powers’ aggression to conquer living space, judiciously commented that in ‘political geometry, the Axis is an unstable figure’.²⁶

One conclusion that I find disagreeable—and I am well aware that I’m being iconoclastic for saying this—is that the Axis had ‘no common military strategy’. Even overlooking theaters such as North Africa, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Eastern Front, the unimplemented invasions Kantokuen and Operation Orient suggest that that is at least questionable.

Quoting James William Morley in Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940, pages 182–3:

On [Tōkyō’s] intent in signing the pact, […] Konoe as well as senior Foreign Ministry and navy officials were sincere in not wanting war with the United States. At the same time, especially after Germany’s victories in Europe, they were not prepared any more than were the army or the right wing radicals in the media and elsewhere in the bureaucracy to defer to American opposition or possible German greed and let China or the former European colonies in Southeast Asia slip from their grasp.

The pact was designed to solve this problem, that is, to confirm [Berlin’s] lack of ambition in these areas and, without war but by presenting an appearance of a formidable German–Japanese military combination, to dissuade the United States from pushing its opposition to Japan to a military showdown.

(Emphasis added in all cases.)

The most important lesson that we should draw from this is that the Axis’s creation was not purely a matter of choice. Nobody coerced another power into agreeing to the alliance, but that is beside the point: the Axis was a consequence of capital’s need to expand. When the Great Depression devastated Imperial Japan’s economy, warfare was the escape hatch. Thus:

The organic weaknesses inherent in Japanese capitalism have made its life span particularly violent and explosive; have driven it to a continuous series of wars since the first Sino‐Japanese war in the 1890s; have driven it far along the road of economic autarchy and [militarism].

These weaknesses and contradictions are primarily four in nature: (a) Necessity of seeking all vital raw materials beyond its natural frontiers (Japan, up to 1941, had to import 80 per cent of the twenty‐five strategic raw materials listed by Fortune as necessary for modern war; one‐half its copper, zinc, tin and scrap iron had to be imported; one‐fourth its pig iron; one‐third its aluminum; three‐fourths of its iron ore; 90 per cent of its lead and all its mercury and nickel). (b) A weak economic base at home, lacking heavy industries (iron and steel, chemicals, etc.). (c) A dependency on its export trade abroad out of which to accumulate profits to purchase the needed raw materials. (d) An inability to accumulate surplus capital with which to develop and exploit foreign conquests and for foreign investment.

In order for [Imperial] Japan to survive at all it was necessary to take certain measures, both industrial and political, to overcome the weight of these initial handicaps. It is our ignoring of the important industrial changes that largely accounts for the underestimation of [Imperial] Japan’s power.

(Emphasis original. Source.)

While the author did not comprehensively address the problem of war, Daniel Guerin’s Fascism and Big Business gives us clues. Page 330:

Export industry complains that it has been sacrificed. In spite of subsidies from the dumping fund, [Fascist] exports are declining in all the foreign markets, and this is aggravated by the circumstance that world economy is itself in decline. In a memorandum addressed to Chancellor Hitler in June, 1937, the spokesmen of the export industry, particularly of the Rhenish‐Westphalian coal barons, state their grievances.¹⁴⁰

Exports are strangled by all sorts of formalities that “transform the exchange of goods into a purely bureaucratic activity.” Export industry lacks raw materials: these are reserved almost exclusively for the armament industry. It lacks labor: “They insist on borrowing the best workers from certain branches of industry” in order to assign them to war or synthetic products industries. It lacks capital: it is unable to grant foreign customers the big credits made necessary by increasing competition. It lacks markets: the result of autarky is to isolate [the Fascist] economy from the world market.

“It has been shown,” the memorandum sadly notes, “that the foreign trade of the principal countries in the world does not necessarily depend on the German market.…” So the export industry demands that engines be reversed and contact resumed with world economy.

But—and they do not mince words—it is impossible “to bring back into the orbit of world economy an economy functioning to the detriment of the domestic value of its currency and carrying on solely such activities as rearmament and autarky.”

Thus, the additions of Ethiopia, the Saar Basin, the Rhineland, Austria, and Sudetenland could not possibly have satiated Fascist capital forever, and when the fascists won the Spanish Civil War on April 1939, there was nowhere else to turn but total war.

[Footnote]

Finally, there is the anticommunist factoid that either Berlin seriously considered inviting Moscow to the Axis, for which we have little evidence. One example of this claim:

To bring a swift conclusion to the negotiations, Germany had offered to include the Soviet Union into the pact, an idea going back to earlier geopolitical visions of a solid totalitarian continental block against the US and the UK.

Goeschel, it seems, was referring to this:

Paradoxically, the setting up of the Axis during Schulenburg’s stay in Berlin only helped him to further his ideas. The Tripartite Part was clearly a vehicle for the establishment of the Continental bloc and initially assumed the inclusion of the Soviet Union by giving her ‘at the proper moment and in a friendly manner […] a free hand towards the south to fulfil any possible wishes in the direction of the Persian Gulf or India’.¹⁶ The prevailing feeling in the Wilhelmstrasse, best expressed by Weizsäcker, was:

We annoyed Russia with the guarantees to Romania […] and yesterday again with the tripartite pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan. It is necessary to compensate these surprises to Russia, if we do not want her to alter her attitude towards us. An attack by Russia is not to be feared because it is not strong enough militarily or as a régime. But Russia could still open its territory to English intrigues and, more importantly, stop the deliveries to us.

It might not have entirely been Goeschel’s fault given how misleadingly Gabriel Gorodetsky worded this, but the context should make it clear that the Tripartite Pact simply stipulated acquiescences to Moscow, not pact membership (in which case it would have been the Quadrupartite Pact). A few pages later, Molotov purportedly said that he ‘did not object to participating in various activities of the four powers but not in the Tripartite Pact, where the USSR was no more than an object’. (What ‘various activities’ he might have had in mind is unclear, but in case it isn’t obvious, ‘participation’ is not the same thing as membership.) Goeschel either misunderstood Gorodetsky’s clumsy writing or he lied to appease a publisher. In any case, this does not substantiate the rumor that Berlin seriously considered including its future Lebensraum into the pact, much less as ‘a solid totalitarian continental block against the US and the UK’ (ugh).

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Other events that happened today (September 27):

1864: Andrej Hlinka, Slovakian fascist, was born.
1940: Julius Wagner‐Jauregg, Fascist eugenicist, dropped dead.
1942: Last day of the Matanikau action on Guadalcanal as United States Marines barely escaped after Axis forces surrounded them.
1944: The Kassel Mission (which aimed to destroy the factories of the engineering works of Henschel & Sohn, which built tracked armoured vehicles and their associated infrastructure) resulted in the largest loss by a USAAF group on any mission in World War II.
2006: Helmut Kallmeyer, a chemist involved in Action T4, took a long overdue dirt nap.