Put another way, the British ruling class was figuratively moving out of Albania and was (eventually) content to hand the keys to the Fascists. Quoting pages 42–3 of Alessandro Roselli’s Italy and Albania: Financial Relations in the Fascist Period:

Shortly after Contarini’s resignation as Secretary‐General to the Foreign Ministry, Mussolini intensified relations with Zogu. The negotiations for a new treaty benefited from the favourable stance adopted by the British government. Whilst Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, refused to acknowledge that Italy should have any exclusive rights and privileges, and gave the [Fascist] government endless formal reminders to respect Albania’s independence, he nonetheless wished to be the faithful executor of the decision made in 1921 by the Ambassadors’ Conference, which had recognized that Italy had vital security interests to defend at the entrance to the Adriatic.

Chamberlain finally came round to considering Albania as an ‘Italian Belgium’, in other words a small country to be protected against aggressive neighbours. Wrongly interpreted as connivance, this appeared to give Italy the green light in Albania. On 27 November 1926, a ‘friendship and security pact’ was signed by Aloisi, the [Fascist] Minister in Tiranë, and the Albanian Foreign Minister, Vrioni. […] Britain maintained a position of benign neglect towards the whole question and accepted the explanations furnished by Italy, which aimed to pass the pact off officially as nothing more than a confirmation of Italy’s special position, as recognized by the Ambassadors’ Conference of 1921.

(Emphasis added. Background to this agreement can be read in chapter 3. The author noted that while initially the two empires did compete for economic dominance, ‘Britain eventually acquiesced, and [Fascist] Italy’s predominance in Albania was finally confirmed.’)