There is a myth that Khrushchev freed millions of innocently convicted, rehabilitated victims of political repression under Stalin. In fact, this myth has nothing to do with reality. Beria carried out a large-scale amnesty, and Khrushchev freed mainly Banderites.

General situation

The victims of political repression are considered to be people convicted under article 58 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The Criminal Code of other republics of the Soviet Union had a similar article. In reality, most of the points in this article were not related to politics. These included: the organization of uprisings, espionage, sabotage (for example, printing counterfeit money), terrorism, sabotage (criminal negligence). Similar articles were and are available in the Criminal Code of any state, including the modern Russian Federation. Only political article 58-10 was purely political: propaganda or agitation, calling for the overthrow, undermining or weakening of Soviet power or for the commission of certain counter-revolutionary crimes, as well as the distribution or production or storage of literature of the same content. Which entailed imprisonment for a term not less than 6 months. Usually, in peacetime, the term for this article did not exceed 3 years. […]

In 1953, in the Gulag camps there were 467,9 thousand prisoners convicted under article 58. Of these, particularly dangerous state criminals (spies, saboteurs, terrorists, Trotskyites, Socialist-Revolutionaries, nationalists, etc.) were 221,4 thousand people. They were in special camps of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. There were also 62,4 thousand exiles. As a result, the total number of “political” was 530,4 thousand people. In total, in the camps and prisons of the USSR in 1953, 2 million 526 thousand people were held.

Amnesty of Beria

On 26 on March 1953, the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lavrenty Beria, submitted a memorandum with a draft decree on amnesty to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The project provided for the release of all prisoners who were sentenced to up to 5 years. […] Beria noted that of the 2,5 million prisoners, only 220 thousand people are especially dangerous state criminals. The amnesty did not extend to dangerous criminals (bandits, murderers), counterrevolutionaries, and convicts for embezzlement of socialist property on an especially large scale. The Minister of the Interior also proposed halving the sentence of convicts for more than 5 years and canceling the link for people who were serving sentences in the 58 article. Beria noted that over 1,5 million people are condemned every year, and the majority for crimes that do not pose a particular danger to Soviet statehood. […]

Therefore, the minister proposed immediately changing the Criminal Code, mitigating criminal liability for minor crimes, and punishing economic, domestic and official crimes with administrative measures. Also, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Malenkov, Beria sent a separate proposal for amnesty for all convicts by extrajudicial bodies (including the “troikas” NKVD and the Special Meeting of the OGPU-NKVD-MGB-MVD) with a complete expungement of the criminal record. Basically here we were talking about those who were convicted during the repressions of 1937-1938.

The day after receiving a note from Beria on March 27 of 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Decree “On Amnesty” for all prisoners whose term did not exceed 5 years, as well as halving the sentences of other prisoners except those sentenced to 10-25 years for banditry, premeditated murder, for counter-revolutionary crimes and for the theft of socialist property on an especially large scale. […] The amnesty was applied to foreigners on a general basis.

As a result, under the amnesty, 1 million 200 thousand people were released, investigations on 400 thousand people were terminated. Among the released there were almost 100 thousand people who were convicted under the 58 article (“political”), but not included in the category of especially dangerous criminals. Also, according to the decree on amnesty, all those exiled were released ahead of schedule, that is, those who were forbidden to reside in certain places and cities.

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Amnesty Khrushchev

4 May 1954 year, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to review all cases against people convicted of “counter-revolutionary crimes.” […] By the beginning of the 1956 year, the commissions considered cases concerning 337,1 thousand people. As a result, 153,5 thousand people were freed, but only 14,3 thousand of them were officially rehabilitated. The decree “On Amnesty” was applied to the rest.

In addition, in September of 1955, the Decree “On the Amnesty of Soviet Citizens Cooperating with the Invaders during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” was issued. A significant part of political prisoners fell under this amnesty. By the beginning of January 1956, the number of persons convicted under Article 58 of the Criminal Code was 113, 7 thousand people. These were mainly people who with weapons in the hands they fought against the Soviet regime, either on the side of the Germans during the Great Patriotic War, or in the ranks of nationalists in Ukraine, the Baltic states and other republics of the USSR.

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By the 1 of July, the 1956 of the year, the commissions considered over 97 thousand cases. More than 46 thousand people were released with a criminal record. But only 1487 people are rehabilitated as convicted on falsified materials. Thus, 90% of political prisoners were released before the famous XX Congress. That is, the role of Khrushchev in the release from the camps and exile of political prisoners is greatly exaggerated.

Why Khrushchev decided to free Bandera, Vlasov and other traitors

To begin with, it is worth recalling that the Soviet government was not as “bloodthirsty” as the “perestroika” and “democratizers” tried to inspire the people. Amnesties for Banderites and other “forest brothers” were regularly carried out under Stalin. The Soviet government skillfully combined the policy of “carrot and stick”, trying not only to suppress the Nazis by force, but also to return many ordinary bandits to civilian life. In Ukraine, Khrushchev personally initiated many amnesties. In addition, in May 1947, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the abolition of the death penalty” was issued. As a result, since the 1947 of the year Banderites and other Nazis no longer faced the death penalty, even for the most terrible war crimes and acts of genocide during the Great Patriotic War and later. That is, the “bloody Stalinist regime” tried with all its might to return even this most criminal part of society to peaceful life.

In September of the 1955 of the year, the Decree “On the amnesty of Soviet citizens who collaborated with the occupiers during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” was issued. The persons convicted of Nazism who were sentenced to up to 10 years of imprisonment were released from places of detention and from other punishment measures; convicted of service in the German army, police and special German forces. Convicts sentenced to over 10 years were reduced by half. Interestingly, such citizens were not simply amnestied, that is, pardoned, but also removed a criminal record and a loss of rights. As a result, many former Ukrainian Nazis, Banderites and members of their families were able to quickly “repaint”, and subsequently enter the Soviet and party bodies. By the 80th years of “perestroika,” they, according to various sources, comprised from a third to half of the Ukrainian state, party and economic elite.

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As the old Bolsheviks and Stalinists were eliminated, which began with the coming of Khrushchev to power, the de-Stalinization, exposure of the “cult of personality,” combined with the cleansing of the party, state, and economic apparatus from the Stalinists, Khrushchev needed support in the Soviet elite. He relied on the Ukrainian wing of the Soviet elite. And Ukrainian society, in fact, is rural, “kulak-petty-bourgeois” (industrialized cities, centers in the east of Lesser Russia). Here the effect of nepotism is very pronounced, similar to the tribal principle, only people are promoted not according to the tribal, clan principle, but according to kinship and comradely relations and relations. That is, Khrushchev relied on local nationalism, which is rapidly growing into Nazism. A similar situation was in other union republics and national republics and autonomies of the RSFSR.

Thus, the early release of Banderites, Vlasovites, policemen [for the Nazi occupation] and other war criminals fit into the policy of Khrushchev’s “perestroika” and de-Stalinization. Khrushchev and, obviously, the part of the Soviet elite behind him (the remnants of the “fifth column”, Trotskyites), tried to “reform” the Soviet Union, “rebuild” it, find a common language with the West. To turn off Stalin’s course on the creation of a fundamentally different civilization and society of the future, to destroy an alternative to the Western world order. Banderites and Vlasovites were to strengthen the “fifth column”. This was one of the preparatory measures for the collapse of Soviet civilization.

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