Tennessee Senate Passes Bill Making "Recruiting" For Trans Youth Care A Felony
www.erininthemorning.com
The bill could have far ranging impacts in Tennessee and outside of the state, and could be broadly used to target health care professionals across state lines.

Tennessee has recently passed a bill, effective July 1st 2024, declaring it a class-C felony to “recruit, harbor, or transport an unemancipated minor within this state” for transgender healthcare procedures, carrying a sentence of 3-15 years in prison. This applies over state lines and states that do not have anti-extradition laws relating to trans rights can extradite you to Tennessee.

Notably: the bill is vague. This means: telling stories of your own transition, describing your healthcare experiences to an open group chat, describing your trans experiences on a public website, creating trans health guides online, describing how you have gotten DIY HRT, describing anything to do with trans healthcare, even as a cis person, can result in a class-C felony conviction.

Given that being arrested in any capacity for transgender people can be an incredibly dangerous experience (CW: SV), I strongly suggest you begin caring about opsec, stop referring to where you live, use VPNs, stop using apps like Discord, and stop using social media sites that track your IP or user agent fingerprint while unprotected. Remember that for a bill like this to be challenged in court, you have to be arrested first.

Will discuss creating / linking to a transgender matrix chat so that we can help people to move off of things like discord.

  • neo [he/him]@hexbear.netEnglish
    5·
    3 months ago

    This really is worth emphasizing, because there are cases where we can reason about the kinds of exploits and vulnerabilities that do happen based on what we learn after the fact, or based on things that companies say they do or must do by implication even if they don’t outright say it.

    For example, I do not recommend Apple’s iMessage. Why? It’s an encrypted chat service, after all.

    It’s because when you use iCloud Backup they store the private keys. If they hold the private keys, they can decrypt the encrypted data whenever they’re subpoenaed or whatever else. So if either party (you or your recipient) has this common feature enabled, your entire chat history is up for grabs. Apple themselves basically say as much here https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec3cac31735/web

    Available-after-authentication service keys: For other services, such as Photos and iCloud Drive, the service keys are stored in iCloud Hardware Security Modules in Apple data centres, and can be accessed by some Apple services. When a user signs in to iCloud on a new device and authenticates their Apple ID, these keys can be accessed by Apple servers without further user interaction or input. For example, after signing in to iCloud.com, the user can immediately view their photos online. These service keys are available-after-authentication keys.

    Bonus reading. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT/