The liberation of the southern provinces in the fall of 1944 set off a series of events that eventually led to the collapse of the Dutch rationing system. It is commonly assumed that the [Axis] intentionally caused famine conditions in the occupied urban areas. In fact, the food crisis was caused by several collateral transportation and allocation problems. Most importantly, a national railway strike, instigated by the Dutch government in London to support the Allied campaign in September 1944, disabled all food transports by train until May 1945.¹⁵

In response to this strike, the […] Reichskommissar for the Netherlands Arthur Seyss‐Inquart imposed an embargo on all inland shipping, making the transport of food from the northern and eastern production areas to Western Holland nigh impossible. Contrary to what academics and non‐academics have assumed, this retaliation measure only lasted for six weeks, instead of the remainder of the [Axis] occupation.

Seyss‐Inquart lifted the embargo under pressure of the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in den Niederlanden, General Friedrich Christiansen, who ‘feared trouble in their rear from the Dutch population due to hunger’.¹⁶

The embargo would nevertheless have a devastating effect on the Dutch rationing system, because producers, transporters and distributers held on to their food and materials after the embargo was lifted out of fear of [Axis] confiscations. This made it especially complicated for the Dutch food officials to restore the rationing system during these final months of occupation.

Other factors exacerbated food shortages. There were only minimal stockpiles of food in the west, as hoarding by households had been prohibited since the beginning of the occupation. Much farm land had been given up to the construction of airfields and fortifications. In addition, the […] Wehrmacht had flooded valuable cultivated land in the west and threatened to flood more in order to delay the Allied advance, which became a matter of heated debates between the occupier and the Allies.¹⁷

The timing of the railway strike and embargo could not have been worse: in September, the crops had not been harvested yet, leaving supplies in the western provinces at their minimum. The transportation of coal from the mining areas in Limburg had ended after the liberation of the south. Consequently, in addition to food problems, fuel shortages rapidly grew severe, which in turn affected food transportation. Finally, shortly after inland shipping resumed, freezing temperatures hindered water transportation until February 1945.¹⁸

As a result, the still occupied western part of the Netherlands — inhabited by 4.3 million people, of whom 2.6 million resided in the large urban areas¹⁹ — had to cope with a severe food crisis, evolving into a brief famine, with official rations dropping as low as 340 kcal per person, per day, in February 1945.²⁰

According to recent studies, over 20,000 people died from direct and indirect causes of the famine conditions during the early months of 1945.²¹ Instead of providing a healthy break from urban life, by 1945, sending children to the food‐producing areas in the northeast became a vital emergency measure.

Click here for photographs, some of which are NSFW or NSFL.

Given the Axis’s dwindling resources in 1945, it is doubtful that it could have independently relieved the Netherlandish famine even if it wanted to, so foreign aid became critical. Quoting Nathan Dyck’s Crossing the Grebbe Line: Canada’s Faustian Bargain to Save Civilians in the Western Netherlands, April–May 1945, page 6:

Sir Jack Drummond, head nutritionist at the British Ministry of Food, presented a resistance‐sourced report to the War Cabinet in January 1945 warning that regardless of its willingness to do so Germany lacked capacity to address the famine. Drummond warned that the estimated daily calorie intake of 500–800 was only sustainable for “two or three months” before death rates would rise rapidly.¹⁷

By March, Churchill’s reluctance to pursue relief efforts began to wane. While ration supply issues delayed concrete action until late April, Gerbrandy’s sustained pleas for aid combined with evidence of widespread malnutrition from British assessments started to tip the scales.

Rather than being purely informed by humanitarian good will, it is a conceivable conclusion that the Allies simply wanted to proactively address a potentially massive strain on organizational capacity if Allied troops had to immediately treat an catastrophe upon gaining access to the occupied area.¹⁸ The Allies were well furnished with Dutch resistance intelligence on the state of the civilian population inside the occupied territory, which by April described a particularly dire situation.¹⁹

Surprisingly, there were enough Axis personnel willing to collaborate with the Western Allies in May 1945 in order for the famine relief to become a modest success, though some minor threats remained. Page 26:

For example, one notable incident was dealt with by 49th Infantry Division:

It was good to note that the enemy watched the proceedings with evident awe, not having seen so many vehs and so much food for a long while… One officer and two ordinary ranks of the German Long Range Sabotage Cp were captured by 1 Leicesters. These and other men had undergone a special course and were then intent upon reaching the back areas of our lines where sabotage would be easy. They carried special explosives.¹¹⁵

(Emphasis added in all cases.)