The BSOD really isn’t something to be mad at, it actually in theory is good but there is only so much you can do when a kernel panics. What you should be mad at is shitty drivers causing BSODs
The BSOD really isn’t something to be mad at, it actually in theory is good but there is only so much you can do when a kernel panics. What you should be mad at is shitty drivers causing BSODs
which definitely seems out of scope.
Doesn’t seem out of scope for a system and service management suite. Like, the timeperiod where systemd was “just an init” was relativly brief (like half a year).
The case is: You switched to it before it was “old-old-stable” and haven’t updated.
Causes for this are likely:
It’s been a thing I personally have been wondering why this is how it is for a while. Personally I like most of the GNOME stuff, but this decision has always stood out as odd.
But then again I almost always use ctrl+w or alt-f4 to close apps, so I am mostly unaffected.
doas
is relativly simple (a few hundred LOC), especially compared to sudo
. The main benefit of run0
over doas
is that it isn’t a SUID binary, they are similary complex.
Basically. systemd-run
was already able to do it, all that really changed is the interface for it. The change to run.c
in the patch itself was <400LOC, and the entire patch was <1.4k lines with most being docs, tests and utils for coloring the terminal.
I don’t understand how this is any improvement over pkexec
That has the same problem as sudo
: the SUID bit is set for it.
The fact that run0
uses polkit is more of a byproduct that this kinda authentication is already done with polkit all over the place in systemd. You can have individual subcommand accessible to different users (for example everyone can systemctl status
, but systemctl reboot
needs to be in the wheel
group) which is why its generally used within systemd already. And it wouldn’t surprise me if again you can do it with this as well, limiting what commands can unconditionally run, need prompt or are completely blocked.
As the other comment said, no. But I’ve had the idea and will to at some point write a edit
script (that I can just set EDITOR=
to) that would just choose one of the first common editors. That could in theory have a -0
option to run as root (there also probably looking through run0
, doas
, sudo
and su
). Not the editor, but doing the editing on a temp file and then copying with root
I don’t know, unless I personally allow the admin to have that kinda access to my files I wouldn’t really want it. And for that case you can enroll recovery keys (which would need to be manually stored, but still) or a fido token or whatever other supported mechanism there is, its LUKS2 backed encryption after all. Then there is also the possibility to just not encrypt the home directory at all.
systemd-run
, which is calling into PID1)dlopen
ed on demand (which was planned even before the attack, which is speculated that the attack was accelerated in timeline because he was on a timer before the change was released)I guess my interpretation was too charitable.
Nothing in the protocol prevents you from splitting the server from the window manager, just everyone implementing the wayland server protocol didn’t see any benefit in splitting it out.
I think what they meant is that there are people that think: “Wayland is too fragmented, there should be 1 ‘Wayland Compositor’ and the rest should be window managers”
This isn’t exactly a “new” attack surface, so removing the attack surface that sudo
(and alternatives) is, is probably a net positive.
it does its authorization with polkit (which IIRC defaults to allow all wheel
group members) and giving users that shouldn’t be allowed root access, root access, is not something you ever want. This is usually referred to as unauthorized privilege escalation. Also, it isn’t like sudo
doesn’t need configuration.
One way to notice a person has “systemd derangement syndrome” is by looking at how they write systemd
: if they write it SystemD
they are already in late stages of SDS and it isn’t curable anymore.
homed
isn’t exactly a home directory replacement, more of an extension. You can mix and match homed and normal home directories like you want (on a per-user basis at least, not within a single user). It does have some nice things, such as user-password based encryption of the home directory, so the password is required to unlock it (no admin access) or automatically using subvolumes on btrfs.
The thing with this is: its just a symlink to the systemd-run
binary, which talks to PID1 to spawn new processes (in separate cgroups IIRC). Its one of the most fundamental parts of systemd. Even the debian systemd
package includes systemd-run
.
I guess the other question is if some tools the distro provides might switch to supporting it by default. For example on Arch there is makepkg
that should never be executed as root, but does internally call some things with elevated privileges (mostly pacman
to install and remove packages). Currently it checks for sudo
and if not falls back to su
, but maybe it might be worth considering changing su
for run0
if its guaranteed to be there.
I don’t really bother with AV on my linux system. What I do is just use trusted software from my repos and run containerized applications.
What I am currently working on is using secure boot with a Unified Kernel Image (already doing that) that boot into a read-only /usr/
partition with verity + signature (one UKI only loads a certain partition with a specific signature, or nothing at all). Any other things I need I create a systemd sysext
that gets overlayed ontop of /usr/
(also read-only) or they get installed as flatpak. For development I would just be using nspawn containers and podman/OCI containers for services that are outside of the other scopes.
This is all based on https://0pointer.net/blog/fitting-everything-together.html which is a nice write down of what I am doing/following.
That already covers a lot of different attack vectors by just not having my system be modifyable outside of my control or apps just being containerized.
Accent colors are coming with GNOME 47.