I’d be curious to know more about the methods used.

Did they somehow spread an infection through the bittorrent protocol, or was there an alternate route used?

How exactly did the malware arrive on consumer devices?

No. Battery optimization is disabled for this app, it’s far more abrupt than a power managed app, and there are crash logs.

This appears daily for the last 2 weeks:

Stacktrace

java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke virtual method ‘java.lang.Class java.lang.Object.getClass()’ on a null object reference at androidx.compose.ui.graphics.layer.LayerManager.persistLayers(Unknown Source:118) at androidx.compose.ui.graphics.AndroidGraphicsContext$componentCallback$1$onTrimMemory$1.onPreDraw(Unknown Source:16) at android.view.ViewTreeObserver.dispatchOnPreDraw(ViewTreeObserver.java:1204) at android.view.ViewRootImpl.performTraversals(ViewRootImpl.java:4723) at android.view.ViewRootImpl.doTraversal(ViewRootImpl.java:3288) at android.view.ViewRootImpl$TraversalRunnable.run(ViewRootImpl.java:11344) at android.view.Choreographer$CallbackRecord.run(Choreographer.java:1689) at android.view.Choreographer$CallbackRecord.run(Choreographer.java:1698) at android.view.Choreographer.doCallbacks(Choreographer.java:1153) at android.view.Choreographer.doFrame(Choreographer.java:1079) at android.view.Choreographer$FrameDisplayEventReceiver.run(Choreographer.java:1646) at android.os.Handler.handleCallback(Handler.java:958) at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:99) at android.os.Looper.loopOnce(Looper.java:230) at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:319) at android.app.ActivityThread.main(ActivityThread.java:8919) at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method) at com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run(RuntimeInit.java:578) at com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main(ZygoteInit.java:1103)

END of stacktrace

Thread info

Name: main ID: 2 State: RUNNABLE Priority: 5 Thread group name: main Thread group parent: system Thread group active count: 32 Thread time: 0 hr 5 min, 5 sec

END of thread info

Device info

Report ID: 14f3b073-a751-49aa-9a7b-222db9bf0e15 Device ID: 88a115ded4d03269 Application version: 69 Default launcher: com.sec.android.app.launcher Timezone name: Pacific Standard Time Timezone ID: America/Vancouver Version release: 14 Version incremental : A546WVLS7CXE1 Version SDK: 34 Board: s5e8835 Bootloader: A546WVLS7CXE1 Brand: samsung CPU ABIS 32: armeabi-v7a, armeabi CPU ABIS 64: arm64-v8a Supported ABIS: arm64-v8a, armeabi-v7a, armeabi Device: a54x Display: UP1A.231005.007.A546WVLS7CXE1 Fingerprint: samsung/a54xcs/a54x:14/UP1A.231005.007/A546WVLS7CXE1:user/release-keys Hardware: s5e8835 Host: SWDK6120 ID: UP1A.231005.007 Manufacturer: samsung Product: a54xcs Build time: 1715231961000 Build time formatted: 08-05-2024 22:19:21 Type: user Radio: A546WVLS7CXE1,A546WVLS7CXE1 Tags: release-keys User: dpi User IDs: N/A Is sustained performance mode supported: No Is in power save mode: No Is in interactive state: Yes Is ignoring battery optimizations: Yes Thermal status: STATUS_NONE Location power save mode: MODE_NO_CHANGE Is device idle: No Battery percentage: 91 Battery remaining time: 31-12-1969 16:00:00 Is battery charging: No Is device rooted: No CPU Model: N/A Number of CPU cores: 8 Up time with sleep: 509 hr 22 min, 56 sec Up time without sleep: 340 hr 53 min, 28 sec

END of Device info

Exit reasons

Exit reason #1 Description: crash Importance: FOREGROUND Reason: CRASH Timestamp: 22-06-2024 10:50:05 END of exit reason #1

Exit reason #2 Description: crash Importance: FOREGROUND Reason: CRASH Timestamp: 22-06-2024 06:08:27 END of exit reason #2

Exit reason #3 Description: crash Importance: FOREGROUND Reason: CRASH Timestamp: 21-06-2024 19:44:57 END of exit reason #3

END of exit reasons

Application info

App name: Jerboa Version code: 69 Version name: 0.0.69 Package name: com.jerboa Short package name: jerboa Flavor: N/A Signatures: nORRaWmGNmrBj18PL/p3svEr/s4= Is debuggable: No First installed: 27-09-2023 19:04:21 Last updated: 15-06-2024 01:37:51 Requested permissions: android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, android.permission.INTERNET, android.permission.READ_MEDIA_AUDIO, android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES, android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO, com.jerboa.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION, android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VISUAL_USER_SELECTED Default prefs: N/A Default prefs: N/A

END of Application info

Currently running foreground/background processes

N/A

END of running foreground/background processes info

Well that’s an easy question:

That’s where the money is, and Trump is for sale.

Huh, usually they ask ‘jump where?’

I’d just like to clarify: the new machines aren’t MRI (the magnets in those would prohibit all metal objects being within 100ft).

The new machines are also xray; but the xray emiters and detector are now on a spinning carriage similar to an MRI. This allows you to build a 3d model of the object and calculate it’s volume, which when combined with the density measurements gives much more reliable material detection.

This also means your stuff doesn’t have to be removed from bags to ensure items aren’t blocking each other from the scanner.

Fun fact: until recently, most airport scanners literally couldn’t differentiate between water and many common explosives. Hence the scrutiny of water based products/possessions.

https://youtu.be/nyG8XAmtYeQ

Across the board: Fixed-cost fines, Instead of fines based on earnings; are just a cost of doing business. Always have been.

… People would be more likely to know the area of their home/floors vs the total volume…

When’s the last time you saw a real estate ad with cubic inches/feet/meters on it?

This makes perfect sense.

I’m guessing this is an Omega Mart product?

(More)

I’m picturing a lineup of people with extreme duck-face; pushing their lips around to move a cursor on their screens…

Why would you ever be buying a sim card seprate from the carrier servicing it…?

Honestly asking, that’s incredibly unusual to me. Where I live, the mobile carrier always provides the sim card. Usually free with a monthly phone plan, or as a part of a pre-paid plan. (pre-paid you can usually buy from a corner store like seven eleven. monthly you’ll actually have to visit their store/mall booth)

Why? Just cos I can.

True. Known as Encrypted Client Hello now, as part of TLS1.3.

It seems many more browsers support it than last I’d looked. I’m curious to see how much of the general web has adopted support for it onnthe server side. I’ll have to look into that more, and see what it’ll take to setup for self-hosting.

It will prevent the ISP from snooping on, or tampering with, the DNS request. However when you go to use the IP you’ve retrieved via DoH/DoT; your first request establishing a TLS connection to that IP will contain an unencrypted SNI which states the domain you are trying to use. This can be snooped on by your ISP.

But what’s not encrypted by either is the Server Name Indicator or SNI, ie: the initial request to a webserver stating which host you’re trying to reach at that IP, before establishing the TLS connection, contains the domain you’d requested via DoH/DoT, in plaintext.

Problem?

deleted by creator

Na, pretty much anything that’ll run linux will do.

Seriously, expect a bill and/or permanently cutoff service when it is discovered.

That’s gonna be quite the bill when the device does eventually disconnect…

I’d expect it to bill you for the extra data retroactively. (otherwise people would just save all the heavy downloads for the end of the month) I’d also expect it to calculate usage regularly as well as upon disconnect, so this plan wouldn’t really work.

If this is really what you want to try though: take a rpi, open a Screen for a persistent terminal, run ‘ping google.com’ and disconnect from that screen (leaving it to endlessly ping google, at least until it’s restarted).