Although this work is mostly about some construction and cement businesses, the author makes it clear that many other Danish businesses chose to work with the Axis as well:

Denmark’s industry, at this stage, was generally oriented towards the domestic market; it maintained few foreign subsidiaries and did not engage in much foreign direct investment. However, the investigation into Danish companies that were operating in Germany and German-occupied countries during World War II illustrates that the war did not necessarily act as a constraint on such enterprises. Despite local and temporary setbacks in production due to a shortage of manpower or raw materials, the war turned out to be a time of expansion—however limited—for the European activities of the two companies F. L. Smidth and Højgaard & Schultz. In comparison with the conditions of industry in other German-occupied western or northern European countries, German authorities hardly interfered with the management of big businesses in Denmark, and large Danish corporations, acting out of economic more than political necessity, chose to collaborate extensively with the occupying power. The activities of F. L. Smidth and Højgaard & Schultz in Germany, the Polish General Government, Estonia, and Serbia underline the willingness, if not eagerness, of companies to collaborate, even if it meant the use of forced or [neo]slave labor. We are thus faced with a clear example of what happens when, in Avraham Barkai’s words, business leaders, instead of asking, “What else could I have done?” fail to ask themselves, “What must I under no circumstances do?” The two companies also demonstrated a level of strategic planning. Economic collaboration in occupied Europe was not simply about the [Fascist] war economy trying to control business but also, in 1939–42, the voluntary choice of companies keen on preserving market shares.

(Emphasis added.)