As to the favorable treatment accorded to [Fascist] Italy, it should be noted that Mussolini was well regarded abroad as a leader who could ensure social stability, a condition that would have facilitated US economic expansion in Europe. Fascist nationalism appeared an attractive system to support: it was vehemently anti-Bolshevik, open to foreign trade and investment, and not threatened by any [substantial] opposition from the left. On the other hand, American loans would work to prevent an Italian aggressive international policy and would help to maintain the status quo.
(Lot of good that fucking did.)
After Lausanne, Italy made a token payment to the US of $1,000,020 in June against the full amount of $13,545,437 and $1 million in December 1933. On June 1934, after having considered a token payment of $1 million, Italy followed the UK example and paid nothing.
[Joke]
June 1933:
United States: ‘Hey, Italy, where’s that $13 that I asked for?’
Fascist Italy: ‘I can give you one dollar.’
United States: ‘Awesome! Okay, see you in a few months, homeboy!’
December 1933:
United States: ‘Hey, you still owe me $12.’
Fascist Italy: ‘I got one buck.’
United States: ‘Sweet! I’ll be back next year to collect the full amount. Well, see ya!’
June 1934:
United States: ‘Give me the $11 you promised me.’
Fascist Italy: ‘No.’
United States: ‘All right, have a nice day!’
Continuing…
As to the British debt, Italy stopped payments after the Hoover Moratorium. [Fascist] Foreign Minister Grandi reported that, in a private talk at the Lausanne conference, Prime Minister MacDonald gave his word of honor that the UK would have not required [Fascist] payments on British debt so long as the Lausanne agreement was in force. But for the sake of political expediency the British could not make such an explicit statement. The statement, however, was confirmed by MacDonald in December 1932, although not publicly.
[…]
The […] strong antagonism to foreign debt forgiveness by the US public in the 1930s stands in sharp contrast with the significant concessions obtained by major debtor countries in the 1920s. [Fascist] Italy was treated particularly favorably in its debt agreements, obtaining a haircut [read: debt deduction] of 82 percent from the US in 1925 and 86 percent from the UK in 1926. The concessions were ‘sold’ to the US electorate as debt restructuring and not debt forgiveness, even though one implies the other. Our account of the events suggests that the Americans granted [Fascist] Italy a very deep [debt deduction] because they recognized that the country had fallen into decline and did not have the capacity to repay. The US decision was facilitated by geopolitical considerations, namely that the Fascist regime was a solid bloc against the spread of Bolshevism.
(Emphasis added.)